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ARTICLE
Susan Saab Fortney
Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance:
Exposing Lawyers’ Blind Spots
Abstract. The legal landscape for lawyers’ professional liability in the
United States is changing. In 2018, Idaho implemented a new rule requiring
that lawyers carry legal malpractice insurance. The adoption of the Idaho rule
was the first move in forty years by a state to require legal malpractice insurance
since Oregon mandated lawyer participation in a malpractice insurance regime.
Over the last two years, a few states have considered whether their jurisdictions
should join Oregon and Idaho in requiring malpractice insurance for lawyers in
private practice. To help inform the discussion, the article examines different
positions taken in the debate on mandatory insurance and recent empirical
research related to uninsured lawyers and legal malpractice litigation. The article
focuses on arguments in favor of mandating insurance and considers
approaches that may address particular concerns expressed by those who
oppose requiring lawyers to carry professional liability insurance. The article
also considers select alternatives to mandatory insurance. After concluding that
mandatory insurance better promotes public and lawyer protection than the
alternatives, the article examines reasons why decisionmakers fail to require that
lawyers carry a minimum level of insurance. Drawing on ethics scholarship and
behavioral psychology research, the article notes that individual uninsured
lawyers may fail to see the consequences of their conduct because they have a
blind spot. The conclusion also suggests that the bar and judiciary may suffer
from a collective blind spot that contributes to lawyers and judges not seeing
financial accountability as an ethics issue. The conclusion urges lawyers who
are insured to address the blind spots and promote their states joining Oregon,
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Idaho and countries around the world that recognize that financial
accountability is a hallmark of an ethical profession.
Author. Susan Saab Fortney is a Professor and Director of the Program for
the Study of Legal Ethics at Texas A&M University School of Law. She thanks
the following individuals for their assistance and helpful feedback, Erin
Dohnalek, Jett Hanna, Ethan Hughes, Milan Markovic and Leslie Levin. She
also thanks St. Mary’s Law Journal and St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice &
Ethics and Interim Dean Vincent R. Johnson for their assistance and the
opportunity to participate in the 2019 ethics and malpractice symposium.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal landscape for lawyers’ professional liability in the United States
(U.S.) is changing.1 In 2016, the members of the Idaho Bar Association
voted on a rule change mandating legal malpractice coverage for Idaho
attorneys in private practice.2 Following the membership’s narrow approval
of the resolution by a vote of 51%, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the
proposed rule with an effective date of January 1, 2018.3 The new Idaho
rule requires lawyers engaged in private practice to submit proof that they
carry professional liability insurance coverage with minimum limits of
liability of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 for an annual aggregate of
claims.4

1. See Petition at 1, In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79, No. ADKT-534 (Nev.
June 29, 2018) [hereinafter Nevada Petition] (referring to the shift in the tide).
2. Annette Strauser, 2018 Malpractice Coverage Requirement—General Information, IDAHO ST. B.
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://isb.idaho.gov/blog/category/licensing/ [http://perma.cc/MZ2H-K8CG].
3. See Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Task Force, Minutes, Presentation by Diane Minnich,
Executive Director of the Idaho State Bar, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N 2–3 (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legal-community/committees/mandatory-malpracticeinsurance-task-force/february-21-2018-minutes.pdf?sfvrsn=9b0407f1_2 [http://perma.cc/B2VM6KPL] [hereinafter Idaho Presentation] (offering a presentation before the Washington Bar on the newly
adopted Idaho rule and the background information on why it was adopted).
4. For licensing purposes, the Idaho rule requires that attorneys certify whether they represent
private clients. Those attorneys who represent private clients must “submit proof of current
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The adoption of the Idaho rule was the first move in forty years by a state
to require legal malpractice insurance since Oregon mandated lawyer
participation in a malpractice insurance regime.5 In 1977, Oregon
established the Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund for the purpose
of providing insurance to bar members. The Oregon requirement that
lawyers in private practice maintain a minimum level of insurance coverage
was unprecedented in the U.S.
Over the last two years, a few states have considered whether to join
Oregon, and now Idaho, in requiring malpractice insurance for practicing
attorneys. Bar groups in California, Washington, Nevada, New Jersey, and
Georgia have studied the issue of mandatory insurance coverage for
attorneys.
In recognition of the “importance of protecting the public from attorney
errors through errors and omissions insurance,” the California legislature
enacted a 2017 statute directing the state bar to review and study errors and
omissions insurance for attorneys licensed in California.6 The statute
identifies a number of areas for study and expressly notes that the study
must cover the advisability of mandating errors and omissions insurance for
attorneys and the adequacy of California’s rule requiring lawyers to disclose
whether they carry insurance. Following the directive from the legislature,
the State Bar of California established a Malpractice Insurance Working
Group (California Working Group).7 On January 14, 2019, the California

professional liability insurance coverage at the minimum limit of $100,000 per occurrence [and]
$300,000 annual aggregate.” IDAHO B. COMM. R. 302(a)(5) (Westlaw 2019).
5. Carol J. Bernick, PLF Celebrates 40 Years, 134 PLF IN BRIEF 1, 1 (May 2018),
https://www.osbplf.org/assets/in_briefs_issues/PLF%20Celebrates%2040%20Years.pdf
[http://perma.cc/A9AY-XX7A].
6. S.B. 36, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 26 (Cal. 2017); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6069.5(a) (Westlaw
2019). In addition to directing the state bar to study mandatory insurance for lawyers, the statute
directs the state bar to review, study and make determinations on all of the following issues: the
adequacy, availability and affordability of errors and omissions insurance for licensed attorneys in
California, proposed measures for encouraging attorneys to obtain and maintain such insurance, the
ranges of insurance limits recommended to protect the public, the adequacy and efficacy of the current
rule relating to disclosure of the attorneys insurance status, and other proposed measures relating to
insurance that will further the goal of public protection. Id.
7. The Board of Trustees of the State Bar of California authorized the formation of the
California Working Group. The State Bar of California Malpractice Insurance Working Group Charter, ST. B.
CAL. 1, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/cc/Malpractice-Insurance-Working-GroupCharter.pdf [http://perma.cc/E8J9-3M4V]. The charter of the California Working Group notes that
the study and review process will include consideration of past studies and convening meetings with
attorneys and other interested parties with knowledge of relevant issues. Id. The charter also outlines
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Working Group rejected a recommendation to require malpractice
insurance as a condition for licensing for attorneys who represent private
clients, but recommended: “More data [as indicated in the Working Group
Report] is required prior to making a recommendation on whether
mandatory malpractice insurance is necessary.”8
In 2017, the Board of Governors for the Washington State Bar
Association established the Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Force
(Washington Task Force).9 The Washington Task Force’s charter
specifically charges the task force with determining whether to recommend
mandatory malpractice insurance for Washington attorneys, developing a
model that might work best in Washington, and then drafting rules to
implement that model.10 In its final report, the Washington Task Force
described its information-gathering process, key findings and its
recommendation that “[a]ctive Washington-licensed attorneys engaged in
the private practice of law, with specified exemptions, should be required to
be covered by continuous, uninterrupted malpractice insurance.”11 The
Washington Task Force Report recommends that the insurance coverage
requirement be managed through the existing annual licensing process.12
A State Bar of Nevada Task Force reached a similar conclusion in 2018,
recommending the adoption of a rule to require all attorneys in private

the appointment source for the 14–17 members of the working group. As noted, one member was to
be a “Consumer Advocate (not licensed attorney).” Id.
8. STATE BAR OF CAL. WORKING GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE
LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 1, 12 (Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA WORKING GROUP REPORT].
9. Washington Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Task Force Charter, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legal-community/committees/mandatory-mal
practice-insurance-task-force/task-force-charter.pdf?sfvrsn=381a3bf1_6
[http://perma.cc/T2C9SCVN].
10. Id. The Washington Task Force’s charter also directs the study to focus on the nature and
consequences of uninsured attorneys, to examine current mandatory malpractice insurance systems,
and to gather information and comments from bar association members and other interested parties.
Id.
11. MANDATORY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO WSBA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS 45 (Feb. 2019) [hereinafter WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Washington
Task Force voted unanimously to approve the report and its recommendation for submission to the
Washington State Bar Association Board of Directors. Id. at 2. The Washington Task Force
recommended that the minimum coverage should be $250,000 per occurrence and $500,000 total per
year. Id. at 45.
12. Id. at 52.
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practice to carry minimum levels of malpractice insurance.13 Based on the
recommendation of the task force, the Board of Governors of the Nevada
State Bar petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada, asking that the Court
amend licensure rules to require professional liability insurance for attorneys
engaged in private practice.14 The sixteen-page petition describes the
justification for requiring insurance and addresses specific concerns
articulated in opposition to such a requirement. The petition’s conclusion
states that “[r]equiring a minimum level of professional liability insurance
for all attorneys directly responds to the state bar’s mission to protect the
public.”15 In a two-page order, the Supreme Court denied the petition,
stating that the Board of Governors “provided inadequate detail and
support demonstrating that the proposed amendment to SCR 79 is
appropriate.”16
The New Jersey State Bar Association took a similar position in
concurring with a recommendation of a Supreme Court Ad Hoc Committee
on Attorney Malpractice to reject mandatory insurance.17 In 2018, “The
Committee determined that a rule requiring mandatory professional liability
insurance would be unworkable in the New Jersey marketplace and would
not satisfy a current and plain unmet need.”18
Also in 2018, the President of the State Bar of Georgia appointed a
committee to investigate issues related to mandatory insurance and
disclosure.19 After the study, the committee recommended that the State
Bar of Georgia require lawyers to be covered by a professional liability policy
13. Vernon “Gene” Leverty, Message from the President: Tipping the Scales in Honor of our Profession,
NEV. LAW. 4 (Apr. 2018), https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/NevadaLawyer_April2018
_PresidentsMessage_taskforces.pdf. [http://perma.cc/6N2H-BVMJ].
14. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 1–16.
15. Id. at 12.
16. Order at 1, In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79, No. ADKT-534 (Nev. Oct. 11,
2018) [hereinafter Nevada Supreme Court Order].
17. Letter from Robert B. Hille, President N.J. State Bar Ass’n, to Hon. Glenn A. Grant, Acting
Admin. Dir. N.J. Court, (Jan. 15, 2018), https://tcms.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/Portals/0/
NJSBA-PDF/Reports%20&%20Comments/malpractice%20insurance%20—%202018.pdf [http://
perma.cc/YDQ9-HWY8] [hereinafter NJSB Comments].
18. Report of the Supreme Court Ad Hoc Committee on Attorney Malpractice Insurance, N.J.
CTS. 7 (June 2017), https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/supreme/reports/2017/attmalpractice
insurance.pdf [http://perma.cc/2NJ8-W7DX] [hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT].
19. Greg Land, State Bar Mulls Rule on Purchase, Disclosure of Legal Malpractice Insurance, DAILY REP.
(Jan. 4, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2019/01/04/will-state-requirepurchase-disclosure-of-legal-malpractice-insurance/ [http://perma.cc/S8LV-XL7Y] (citing the State
Bar of Georgia President who explained that reports from malpractice lawyers described problems of
malpractice as “pervasive” and spurred his call to create the committee to study the issue).
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in the amount of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 for the aggregate,
the limits of which would not be reduced by payments of attorney’s fees or
claims of expenses incurred for defending claims under the policy.20
As states consider the advisability of mandatory insurance, it is worth
examining different positions in the debate on mandatory insurance and
recent empirical research related to uninsured lawyers and legal malpractice
litigation. To introduce the topic, Part I provides a historical note with
information on the current status of requiring malpractice insurance for
lawyers in practice. Part II examines arguments in favor of mandating
insurance.
Part III tackles common arguments opposing such a
requirement. The discussion of the insurance debate focuses on arguments
in favor of insurance and approaches that may be used to address concerns
expressed by those who oppose requiring lawyers to carry professional
liability insurance. Following the discussion of the pros and cons of
mandating insurance, Part IV considers select alternatives to mandatory
insurance that are in current use. After concluding that mandatory insurance
better promotes public and lawyer protection than the alternatives, the
conclusion examines reasons why decisionmakers fail to require that lawyers
carry a minimum level of insurance. Drawing on ethics scholarship and
behavioral psychology research, I argue that individual, uninsured lawyers
may fail to see the consequences of their conduct because they have a blind
spot. Furthermore, I argue that the bar and judiciary may suffer from a
collective blind spot that contributes to responsible lawyers and judges not
seeing financial accountability as an ethics issue. This ethical blindness and
complacency allow the minority to dominate the discourse on lawyer’s
professional responsibility and accountability for their acts and omissions.
The conclusion urges lawyers who are insured to address the blind spots
and promote their states joining Oregon, Idaho and countries around the
world that recognize that financial accountability is a hallmark of an ethical
profession.
I. HISTORICAL AND PRACTICE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE
ON MANDATORY LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
Around the world both common law and civil law regulators require that
lawyers maintain a minimum level of professional liability insurance
20. Memorandum from Paula J. Frederick, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Ga. Executive Comm.
(Feb. 28, 2019) (on file with author). The committee preferred that the enforcement of the insurance
requirement rule would be through an administrative suspension and not a disciplinary penalty. Id.
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coverage.21 Depending on the regulatory scheme, carrying insurance could
be a statutory mandate in civil law countries or a requirement imposed by
professional associations in common law countries.22 The majority of
common law countries outside the U.S. require some form of malpractice
insurance. 23 The minimum coverage required in these countries is at least
one million dollars in those countries’ currencies.24
The Law Society for England and Wales described the justification for
mandating professional indemnity insurance (PII) as follows:
PII also increases your financial security and serves an important public
interest function by covering civil liability claims, including: certain related
defence costs, and regulatory awards made against you. It ensures that the
public does not suffer loss as a result of your civil liability, which might
otherwise be uncompensated. This is important in maintaining public
confidence in the integrity and standing of solicitors.25

In the U.S., concerns about affordability and accessibility of malpractice
insurance prompted bar associations to seriously examine mandatory
insurance. In the late 1970s, the restrictive insurance market caused lawyers
to explore alternatives to private insurance.26 In an effort to provide
affordable insurance, some bar associations established bar-related mutual
companies.27 Lawyers in other states, including California, Washington and

21. Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 177, 189 (2012) [hereinafter Law as a Profession].
22. Dimitra Kourmatzis, Professional Liability Insurance Coverage in Common and Civil Law
Jurisdictions—Event Made and Claims Made Approaches, 2009 INS. L. REV. 41, 41.
23. See Leslie C. Levin, Uninsured Lawyers and Professional Liability Insurance Requirements: What Does
the Research Tell Us?, NW LAW., Aug. 2018, at 36, 36 [hereinafter Uninsured Lawyers] (noting the vast
majority of common law counties outside the U.S.—as well as civil law countries—require some form
of malpractice insurance for lawyers in private practice).
24. The Washington Task Force Report identified the following minimum limits of liability
required in the other common law jurisdictions as follows: AU $1.5 million or AU $2 million (US $1.11
million or US $1.48 million) in most Australian states; CDN $1 million (US $760,000) in British
Columbia; S $1 million (US $730,000) in Singapore; and £2 million (US $2,628,000) in England and
Wales. WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 27.
25. Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 189 (quoting Professional Liability Insurance, L. SOC’Y § 3.2
(July 4, 2012)).
26. 5 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 38:3 (2019 ed.) [hereinafter LEGAL
MALPRACTICE TREATISE].
27. Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 191. There are currently thirteen U.S.-based companies
that are members of the National Organization of Bar-Related Insurance Companies (NABRICO).
Member Companies, NABRICO, https://nabrico.com/members/ [http://perma.cc/HYK3-JLRM].
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Oregon “explored the possibility of lowering insurance costs by requiring
all lawyers” in the state to purchase legal malpractice insurance.28
Following study and proposed legislation mandating legal malpractice in
California, the governor refused to sign the bill.29 Oregon then “borrowed
the proposed California legislation and passed it as its own.”30 On July 1,
1978, Oregon became the first state in the U.S. to require that all lawyers
purchase minimum levels of insurance coverage provided through the
state’s professional liability fund. Although some lawyers challenged the
constitutionality of compelling lawyers to purchase insurance from a staterelated entity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
requirement that lawyers purchase primary insurance from the Oregon
program.31
When the Oregon fund was first established, the primary coverage
required was $100,000 with a separate $50,000 available for defense costs.32
In 2019, the basic primary coverage is $300,000 per claim and $300,000 in
aggregate for claims made against each attorney each year, and $50,000 for
claims expenses with an annual payment reduced to $3,300 per attorney in
private practice.33 Idaho, the second U.S. jurisdiction to require mandatory
insurance, requires minimum limits of liability of $100,000 per occurrence
and $300,000 for an annual aggregate of claims.34 The Idaho requirement
does not specify any one insurance carrier, but allows lawyers to purchase

28. Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 191.
29. Id.
30. Manual R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV.
2583, 2610 (1996).
31. Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1463 (9th Cir. 1989). The defendant-appellee
challenged the insurance requirements on constitutional and antitrust grounds. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the antitrust attack because the activity was undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy. Id. The court also rejected the constitutional challenge because
the mandatory participation provision of the bar’s resolution “regulates a local matter in which the
state has a strong interest, and the provision does not impose an excessive burden, if any, on interstate
commerce.” Id.
32. Bernick, supra note 5, at 1.
33. See About the PLF, OR. ST. B. (2019), https://www.osbplf.org/about-plf/overview.html
[http://perma.cc/P4B4-F59A] [hereinafter Oregon’s Professional Liability Fund] (providing an in-depth
report on Oregon’s Professional Liability Fund).
34. For licensing purposes, the Idaho rule requires that attorneys to certify whether they
represent private clients. Those attorneys who represent private clients must submit proof of current
professional liability insurance coverage at a minimum limit of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000
annual aggregate. IDAHO B. COMM. R. 302(a)(5) (Westlaw 2019).

2019]

Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance

199

insurance in the open market.35
In addition to the Idaho and Oregon requirements that apply to all
lawyers in private practice, malpractice insurance may also be mandated for
particular types of practice or work. For example, it is common for lawyer
referral agencies to require insurance.36 Similarly, around the U.S., a
number of states require certain levels of insurance as a condition for
lawyers who practice in limited liability law firms.37 In private transactions,
sophisticated clients, such as corporations, routinely require that counsel
they retain provide proof of insurance.38
As noted above, there is a new wave of state bar associations appointing
groups to study mandatory insurance and related issues. When the issue
was raised in the past, lawyers and bar leaders discussed in bar journals and
internet pieces the pros and cons of mandating insurance for lawyers.39
Even a few law students published law review pieces examining the issue.40
35. Robert Horne & Jennifer Smith, Join the Discussion: Whether Malpractice Insurance Should be
Mandatory for Nevada Attorneys, NEV. LAW., Dec. 2017, at 28, 28.
36. The ABA Model Rules Governing Lawyer Referral & Information include a provision
requiring that lawyer-participants maintain errors and omissions insurance or provide proof of financial
responsibility. MODEL SUPREME COURT RULES GOVERNING LAWYER REFERRAL & INFORMATION
SERVICE R. IV (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_referral/
policy/ [http://perma.cc/JQP6-ZXCG].
37. For a discussion of insurance requirements for limited liability partnerships, see CHRISTINE
HURT ET AL., BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 2.06 (2d ed. 2018).
Some jurisdictions base the amount of insurance on the number of lawyers in the firm. Such an
approach provides more protection to malpractice plaintiffs with claims against large law firms. See,
e.g., 100A ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 722(b)(1) (West 2019) (requiring limited liability firms maintain a
minimum “amount of insurance of $100,000 per claim and $250,000 annual aggregate, times the
number of lawyers in the firm . . . provided that the firm’s insurance need not exceed $5,000,000 per
claim and $10,000,000 annual aggregate”). For a discussion of the insurance issues related to practice
in limited liability firms, see Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities: An
Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 641 (1998).
38. Manual R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657,
1730 (1994) [hereinafter The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret].
39. See John Schlegelmilch, Insufficient Evidence to Support Mandatory Malpractice Insurance
Requirements, NEV. LAW., June 2000, at 9, 9 (submitting the argument “that there is insufficient evidence
to support any State Bar” requirements for malpractice insurance); Jeffrey A. Tidus, Mandatory
Malpractice Insurance: Any Feasible Plan Must Enable Lawyers to Obtain Affordable Coverage, L.A. LAW.,
Mar. 1987, at 16, 16 (examining whether lawyers who do not carry malpractice insurance can pose a
threat to the general public); Jeffrey M. Wilson, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance—The Debate Continues,
ADVOCATE, Nov. 1994, at 6, 16 (claiming small town lawyers will not be impacted through a
requirement that they maintain malpractice insurance).
40. See Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of
Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 640–53 (1995) (examining and
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A number of these articles were written before there were studies dealing
with uninsured lawyers and malpractice claims. Some findings come from
surveys conducted by bar groups. Other assessments come from studies
and analyses conducted by scholars. Notably, Professor Leslie C. Levin
published the results of her study on uninsured lawyers.41
Professors Herbert M. Kritzer and Neil Vidmar have recently published a
book that includes qualitative and quantitative data related to legal
malpractice claims and the impact of lawyers’ insurance status on victims of
lawyer malpractice.42 To help inform the debate on imposing an insurance
requirement, the following discussion of the pros and cons of mandatory
insurance draws on findings and commentary from these scholarly works,
as well as bar studies.
II. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MANDATORY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
In his seminal article on the role that legal malpractice plays in our
regulatory system, Professor John Leubsdorf, an associate reporter on the
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers,
noted that legal malpractice relates to three regulatory functions of the law
of lawyering by “delineating the duties of lawyers, creating appropriate
incentives and disincentives for lawyers in their dealings with clients and
others, and providing access to remedies for those injured by improper
lawyer behavior.”43 Arguments supporting mandatory insurance directly or
presenting arguments “in favor of requiring malpractice insurance for attorneys”); Nicholas A. Marsh,
Note, “Bonded & Insured?”: The Future of Mandatory Insurance Coverage and Disclosure Rules for Kentucky
Attorneys, 9 KY. L.J. 793, 793–94 (2003) (exploring mandatory insurance coverage for attorneys); Devin
S. Mills & Galina Petrova, Note, Modeling Optimal Mandates: A Case Study on the Controversy over Mandatory
Professional Liability Coverage and Its Disclosure, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1029, 1029–30 (2009)
(considering mandatory professional liability and accompanying disclosures).
41. Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers Going Bare and Clients Going Blind, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1281, 1287–88
(2016) [hereinafter Lawyers Going Bare] (using information from a 2011 survey of uninsured New Mexico
lawyers and recent surveys of insured and uninsured lawyers in Arizona and Connecticut).
42. HERBERT M. KRITZER & NEIL VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP: IMPROVING
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE VICTIMS (2018). Professors Kritzer and Vidmar note
that calls for mandatory insurance are not new. Id. at 170. According to a review conducted by research
assistants, forty-seven articles have been written on mandatory insurance with the many articles
advocating in favor of mandatory insurance for lawyers. Id. at 217 n.4. One of the earliest articles
advocating for mandatory insurance was written by Manual R. Ramos, a law professor who previously
defended legal malpractice cases. See The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, supra note 38, at 1725–30
(addressing arguments on both sides of the mandatory insurance debate for both requiring a duty to
report and a duty to carry coverage).
43. John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 105
(1995).
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indirectly relate to each of these functions, starting with the concern that
victims of legal malpractice are denied access to meaningful remedies when
lawyers fail to carry professional liability insurance. This is commonly
characterized as the public protection justification for requiring that licensed
lawyers carry malpractice insurance.
A. Public Protection & Access to Remedies
Legal malpractice as a type of third-party insurance covers claims seeking
damages arising out of the insured’s acts, errors, or omissions in rendering
legal services to others.44 Policy coverage is triggered when a person alleges
that a lawyer has engaged in conduct that damaged the claimant. This points
to the most compelling reason for requiring insurance: to provide access to
remedies for malpractice victims, whether the injured person is a client or a
nonclient.
States restrict the practice of law to licensed attorneys. This special
privilege comes with the responsibility to be accountable when lawyers’
misdeeds harm others.45 This financial accountability distinguishes lawyers
as professionals.
As a matter of professionalism, lawyers should be required to bear the
costs of practicing law and not shift losses to others. Applying tort law and
risk distribution principles, lawyers—not clients or injured third parties—
are the persons in the best position to guard against and obtain insurance
for losses caused by the lawyers’ professional misconduct.46 Lawyers can
then factor in insurance costs when setting fees.
Despite these basic principles of tort law and the professional imperative
to be financially accountable, a significant portion of lawyers practice

44. RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE: THE LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING
LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE § 2:21 (2019 ed.) [hereinafter INSURANCE PURCHASING GUIDE].
For an explanation on the different types of policies and insurers’ preference for claims-made policy
forms, see Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. LEGAL PROF.
41, 43 (2003-2004) [hereinafter Legal Malpractice Insurance] (identifying different types of claims-made
policy forms).
45. “A license to practice law is a privilege, and no lawyer should be immune from his or her
responsibility to clients injured because of those mistakes.” WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 11, at 38.
46. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
500 (1961) (introducing a critique of “enterprise liability” with the following notions: “Activities should
bear the costs they engender [and] it is only fair that an industry should pay for the injuries it causes”
(quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, ON TORTS 731 (1957)).
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without insurance.47 This poses a serious risk to clients who rely on lawyers,
as well as third parties who are injured by lawyers’ misdeeds.48 Uninsured
lawyers impede the ability of victims to obtain redress, largely because of
the economics and challenges associated with successfully pursuing a legal
malpractice case.49
Most fundamentally, the lack of insurance will make it highly unlikely
(some would say virtually impossible) for most legal malpractice victims to
retain counsel to pursue a claim, unless the victim is able to pay legal fees
associated with prosecuting the case. Interviews with experienced plaintiffs’
lawyers confirmed a commonly held belief that experienced lawyers will
decline to represent malpractice victims, unless the prospective defendantlawyer carries insurance.50 Experienced lawyers also avoid cases involving
uninsured defendants because uninsured defendants may proceed pro se
and any judgment obtained would be uncollectable.51 These conclusions
are logical, especially when the target is a lawyer with limited means to pay
defense costs, let alone a judgment. Even if the prospective defendant could
afford defense costs, plaintiffs’ lawyers may be concerned that uninsured
lawyers may hide or shield assets, creating serious questions on the ability to
recover amounts awarded in malpractice judgments.52
Consumers who infrequently retain legal counsel are the persons who are
more likely to retain solo or small firm lawyers.53 Because of the higher
concentration of uninsured lawyers among the ranks of solo and small firm
lawyers, these clients may unwittingly hire uninsured lawyers.54 As a result,
47. For a table based on available data on uninsured lawyers in private practice, see KRITZER &
VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 41.
48. See WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 45 (noting uninsured lawyers
pose serious risks to clients and themselves).
49. See Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse Doors for Legal
Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2038–41 (2017) [hereinafter Tort in Search of a Remedy]
(discussing how the complex and expensive nature of legal malpractice cases makes it very difficult for
many malpractice victims to retain counsel to handle cases on a contingency fee basis). Depending on
the facts of a case, it is common for experienced plaintiffs’ attorney to require a minimum amount of
damages, such as $300,000, before the attorney agrees to a contingency fee. Id. at 2039.
50. KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 148.
51. Id.
52. See Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1330 (suggesting one reason that the percentage of
uninsured lawyers may be higher in some states is because of state laws that make it easy to shield
assets from malpractice judgments).
53. See KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 42 (concluding clients using small-firm lawyers
or solo practitioners have a “substantial chance of dealing with a lawyer who lacks insurance”).
54. See Uninsured Lawyers, supra note 23, at 36 (“Ordinary people are overwhelmingly the ones
who are harmed by uninsured lawyers. This is because most individuals hire solo and small firm lawyers
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the clients may feel doubly victimized when malpractice occurs and the
lawyer is uninsured.55
Although experienced users of legal services may hire firms who carry
and maintain insurance, infrequent consumers may not even ask lawyers
about insurance in those states where lawyers are not required to directly
disclose the lawyers’ insurance status to prospective clients. According to a
public opinion poll conducted for the State Bar of Texas, 87.1% of the
respondents indicated that they did not ask if their attorneys carried
professional liability insurance.56 Many lay people may mistakenly believe
that lawyers are required to carry insurance. Subject to limitations in the
policy, mandatory insurance protects all users of legal services, especially the
most vulnerable due to the disparate positions between lawyers and clients.
In short, mandatory insurance is necessary to protect the public by
providing a source of compensation for persons injured by attorneys’
malpractice.
B. The Mission of the Organized Bar & Integrity of the Legal Profession
Bar groups that have recommended mandating insurance focus on the
risk that uninsured lawyers pose to the public. The Petition filed by the
State Bar of Nevada went so far as to say that requiring insurance responds
to the bar’s mission as it “puts in place safeguards for both the attorney and
client if a negligent act occurs.”57
Similarly, the February 2019 Report of the Washington Task Force on
Mandatory Malpractice Insurance focuses on the risk to the public, noting
that the mission of the bar association includes serving the public, ensuring
the integrity of the legal profession, and championing justice.58 In
for their legal matters.”); see also KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 5 (using a two-hemisphere
dichotomy of corporate clients who hire larger firms as compared to personal service sector clients
who more frequently hire solo and small firm lawyers).
55. See Uninsured Lawyers, supra note 23, at 36 (reviewing the prolonged battle that a former client
in litigating with an uninsured defendant on a claim that an insurer would likely have settled many years
earlier).
56. Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 197 n.105 (citing PLI Disclosure Survey of the Public,
ST. B. TEX. (Nov. 2009), http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PublicSurvey.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q69R-6Y3N]).
57. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 1. “The State Bar’s mission is to govern the legal profession,
to serve our members, and to protect the public interest. This mission is fulfilled through rigorous
admission standards, disciplinary proceedings and client protection programs.” Id. at 1.
58. WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 (referring to the mission “to serve
the members of the Bar”). “Protection of the public is the overriding public duty of lawyers, the WSBA,
and the Washington Supreme Court.” Id.
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commenting on the autonomy of lawyers to not purchase insurance and the
role of the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA), the Washington Task
Force Report to the Board of Governors made the following observations:
While it may be appropriate for lawyers to evaluate and assume personal
risks created by lack of [professional liability] insurance, the Task Force
concluded that it is simply not fair for the clients. Clients of uninsured lawyers
often have a difficult time obtaining compensation from those lawyers after a
malpractice event. Clients of uninsured lawyers have an especially difficult
time finding legal representation for [quite] legitimate claims against uninsured
lawyers because malpractice plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely decline to handle
those claims. . . .
In the Task Force’s view, there is a distinct problem that directly affects
the public interest, and a solution is needed. The Washington Supreme Court
as the supervisory authority over the practice of law in this state, regulates the
profession to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the legal
profession, and it does so by adopting rules for the regulation of the practice
of law.59

As noted by Professor Levin, “uninsured lawyers . . . threaten to undermine
the public’s trust in lawyers” when clients discover that they have no
meaningful recourse against their uninsured lawyers and when media report
stories about clients who cannot recover for the harm caused by uninsured
lawyers.60
Meaningful public protection through mandatory insurance helps fosters
confidence in the legal profession.61 More malpractice judgments may
improve the public perception of lawyers if members of the public see that
lawyers cannot escape liability for their mistakes that cause harm to others.62
By providing access to remedies to malpractice victims, mandatory
insurance advances the status of law as an honorable, self-regulatory
profession that holds lawyers accountable for their misdeeds. “If we fail to

59. Id. at 38.
60. Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1319.
61. See Professional Indemnity Insurance—10 Key Questions Answered, THE L. SOC’Y (July 24, 2017),
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/articles/professional-indemnity-insurance10-key-questions-answered [http://perma.cc/46HW-FCVN] (explaining professional liability
insurance is important for public confidence in the legal profession).
62. See Cunitz, supra note 40, at 652 (suggesting more cases reaching the court system will
generate publicity and may alter the public perception of the legal profession).
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protect those who rely on us, we fail to fulfill our obligations as a protected
profession.”63
C. Preserves Attorney Self-Regulation
Proponents of insurance also warn that failure to act will invite legislative
control of the legal profession.64 Arguably, the legal profession does not
deserve to be self-regulated if we fail to discharge our responsibilities to
protect the public and provide remedies to those we injure.65 Although this
argument may appear to be an empty threat, developments over the last
twenty years point to a shift towards more administrative and legislative
regulation of lawyers.66 In discussing how lawyers are increasingly subject
to legislation that governs their conduct, Professor James M. Fischer
suggests that there will be increased “flashpoints between legislators and the
bar over lawyers’ professional and public duties.”67 The mandatory
insurance issue may ignite such a flashpoint, requiring the bar to take
decisive action to protect the public and discharge professional duties.
This may first occur in California given the 2017 statute requiring the state
bar to review and study the legal malpractice insurance issue and to report
back to the legislature no later than March 31, 2019.68 Following the state
bar’s report to the legislature, decisionmakers may fashion a legislative
solution if they determine that the bar is unwilling to take steps that protect

63. Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 215.
64. See, e.g., Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1319 (pointing to concerns that if the bar does
not self-regulate and require lawyers to carry insurance, legislatures may impose the requirement).
65. “Once confidence is lost in the bar’s ability to regulate itself in ways that are consistent with
the public interest, state legislatures may increasingly become involved in lawyer regulation.” Id.
66. See Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OK.
CITY U. L. REV. 559, 608 (2005) (reviewing recent developments and implications for lawyer selfregulation). Increasingly, there are challenges to lawyer self-regulation. E.g., Renee Newman Knake,
The Legal Monopoly, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1307–08 (2018) (referring to lawyer self-regulation as
“problematic on multiple levels”).
67. James M. Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 108
(2006).
68. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6069.5 (Westlaw 2019). The statutory directive opens with the
following phrase: “In recognition of the importance of protecting the public from attorney errors
through errors and omissions insurance . . . .” Id. § 6069.5(a). One California expert on lawyer
regulation suggests that this phrase provides a glimpse of the legislature’s attitude on the insurance
issue and that the legislature has already made up its mind and that the public needs protection through
insurance. James Ham, Will California Have Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Attorney and What Will It
Look Like? (2018) (unpublished paper on file with author).
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the public and advance access to justice.69
D. Improves Risk Management & the Delivery of Legal Services
Lawyers who carry insurance benefit from the role that insurers play in
risk management and practice assistance. Although it may be a challenge to
quantify the impact of risk management, studies have revealed that the
implementation of risk management techniques saved firms millions in
claims70 and were associated with a substantial reduction in the number of
complaints against lawyers who implemented appropriate management
systems.71
Insurers’ risk management assistance to lawyers takes various forms.72
Most obviously, insurers assist lawyers by educating them through
continuing legal education programs, seminars, practice materials, and
newsletters.73 In addition, insurers provide individual guidance to firms.
This individual guidance includes consultations on specific issues and
practice reviews or audits of firm risk management systems that relate to

69. See Fisher, supra note 67, at 98 (“In California, aggrieved individuals and groups have
developed a practice of seeking legislative solutions to issues that were once seen as entirely within the
purview of the bar.”).
70. See News Brief, Risk Management Techniques Can Save Firms Millions in Claims, 1997 ANDREWS
INS. INDUS. LITIG. REP. 22529, 22529 (reporting on the results of survey of 395 of the approximately
1,100 law firms in the U.S. employing thirty-five or more attorneys). The survey conducted by Louis
Harris & Associates identified two key practices that correlate to large saving in liability dollars. Id.
“Firms which have a designated risk management partner or committee, on average, paid out over
$1 million less for the largest claim they resolved over the past five years. [And f]irms which have a
separate partner or committee to oversee the acceptance of new clients and engagements, on average,
paid out approximately $800,000 less for the largest claim.” Id.
71. See Susan Saab Fortney, Preventing Legal Malpractice and Disciplinary Complaints: Ethics Audits as
a Risk-Management Tool, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2015, at 1, 2 (reporting on the results of an Australian
study that revealed that the complaints rate against law firms that completed a self-assessment process
went down by two-thirds and the complaints rates for those firms was one-third of the number of
complaints registered against firms that had not completed the process). For additional discussion of
the self-assessment process as part of a proactive, management-based regulation program, see infra Part
IV–C.
72. For an overview of insurer’s risk management efforts and positive impact on the quality of
legal services, see Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 220–22 (1996) [hereinafter Insurers as Regulators].
73. Id. at 220 (noting the programs deal with fundamental firm management issues, as well as
particular issues, such as conflicts, dockets, and file controls). For a discussion on risk management
services that insurers offer solo and small firm lawyers, see Leslie C. Levin, Regulators at the Margins: The
Impact of Malpractice Insurers on Solo and Small Firm Lawyers, 49 CONN. L. REV. 553, 582–84 (2016)
[hereinafter Regulators at the Margin].
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preventing malpractice.74 In the event that the review reveals areas in need
of improvement, the insurer’s representative may recommend remedial
steps for resolution or the insurer may require implementation of
appropriate measures as a condition to obtaining insurance.75
The Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), a legal malpractice
mutual formed by large law firms, pioneered loss prevention audits for
member firms and the designation of loss prevention partners at member
firms.76 This initiative was part of the movement of law firms to designate
ethics counsel and general counsel who contribute to the improvement of
the quality of legal services.77 Other carriers offer audits provided by
employees of the insurer or outside counsel.78 These audits are designed to
review firm policies and procedures, as well as informal controls that focus
on ethics and malpractice concerns.79
Some insurers provide self-audit materials that enable lawyers to
systematically review firm policies and procedures relating to the firm’s
ethical infrastructure and delivery of legal services, such as the firm’s
procedures related to commencing and documenting the attorney-client
relationship. In recent years, insurers have provided lawyers a great deal of
guidance in adapting to the new world of electronic communications and
data security. This assistance benefits lawyers as well as clients they serve.
74. Insurers as Regulators, supra note 72, at 220–22 (“Also within this education category are the
variety of newsletters and even more substantial publications issued to insured by Insurers to guide
and assist insureds in avoiding claims by adopting improved practice management.”).
75. Id.
76. See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms,
24 CONN. INS L.J. 1, 13 (2017) [hereinafter Mutually Assured Protection] (describing the origin of ALAS).
After analyzing qualitative data based on interviews and participants’ observations related to the role
of ALAS and other mutual organizations, Professors Baker and Swedloff conclude that mutual
insurance arrangements in the lawyers’ professional liability sector serves the members firms as well as
the legal profession. Id. at 62.
77. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General
Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 590 (2002) (examining
the contributions that compliance specialists play in law firms). “Several [study] participants
credit ALAS for shaping the development of in-house compliance efforts in their firms; and we heard
similar comments about the role of other insurers . . . .” Id. at 590.
78. For a discussion of practice audits by a person who conducts them for insurers and firms,
see Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer Regulation,
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 111–12 (2008) [hereinafter Risk Management].
79. See Insurers as Regulators, supra note 72, at 221 (noting “some law firms are beginning to
recognize the value of streamlined practice management in the increasingly competitive marketplace in
which they operate, and are, therefore, voluntarily commissioning and undergoing risk management
audits”).
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In addition to the valuable assistance that insurers provide lawyers in
avoiding and dealing with malpractice concerns, insurers’ positive impact on
lawyers’ practices actually starts with the terms of insurance policies. Policy
provisions can be written in such a way to dissuade lawyers from engaging
in risky and unwise practices. As explained by insurance law experts,
Professors Tom Baker and Rick Swedloff: “Insurers also use contract
provisions that eliminate or reduce coverage for claims thought to pose a
high degree of moral hazard. . . . These contract designs regulate indirectly.
By leaving a greater share of certain liability risks on the insured, they
encourage greater vigilance over those risks.”80
In analyzing such contract provisions in legal malpractice insurance
policies, Anthony E. Davis, a risk management expert, explains that the
policy provisions may supplement or clarify the definition of prohibited
conduct beyond the terms and standards of ethical constraints or may limit
or exclude coverage for conduct not forbidden by the ethics rules.81 For
example, malpractice policies include some form of business pursuits
exclusion that eliminates coverage for claims related to business transactions
with clients.82 These exclusions recognize the serious risks associated with
such claims and the difficulty in lawyers engaging in such activities in
accordance with applicable ethics rules and fiduciary principles.83 Over the
years lawyers have heeded the warnings and prohibited such transactions in
their law firms.84 Firm managers and ethics counsel can justify the
prohibitions by pointing to the policy exclusions.

80. Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional
Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1420 (2013) [hereinafter Regulation of Liability Insurance].
81. See Insurers as Regulators, supra note 72, at 211–20 (providing examples of policy provisions
which augment existing ethical rules and those that create new classes of restricted conduct).
82. Some policy exclusions are narrow, eliminating claims related to the business enterprise
while others are broader in extending to claims related to the rendition of legal services to the
enterprise. See id. at 212–14 (reviewing policy approaches).
83. See id. at 214 (noting cases involving business pursuits “invariably cast the lawyers in a
negative, self-interest light. . . .[and are] difficult to defend and lead to awards or settlements that reduce
[i]nsurers’ profits”). “By excluding coverage, [i]nsurers attempt to make the profession confront the
fact that lawyers who engage in representations involving conflicts, even if such representations are
technically permissible, will assume the entire risk of the consequences.” Id.
84. “While it is generally imprudent to do business with a client, it is very dangerous and
irresponsible to do so if the policy’s business pursuit exclusion eliminates coverage for all claims
relating to the business enterprise.” SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 547 (2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter LEGAL
MALPRACTICE LAW].
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Insurers’ positive impact on the implementation of risk management
measures also dates back to the time when lawyers apply for insurance.
Insurance applications require lawyers to describe how the firm handles
matters such as conflicts checking and tracking deadlines. To respond to
the application questions, lawyers must consider their policies and
procedures. Lawyers who do not have policies and procedures in place
should develop them in order to complete the application. Renewal
applications should also contribute to lawyers evaluating the adequacy of
policies and procedures related to practice and risk management.85
Once insured, lawyers can obtain their insurers’ guidance when dealing
with ethics and malpractice concerns. This is illustrated in Oregon where
all lawyers in private practice receive practice management assistance as
participants in a mandatory insurance plan provided by the Oregon
Professional Liability Fund (PLF). The PLF has developed an outstanding
reputation for its loss prevention and mitigation efforts that have evolved
into a comprehensive Personal and Practice Management Assistance
Program86 which assists thousands of lawyers a year.87
Requiring insurance in other jurisdictions will extend the reach of such
practice management assistance and possibly incentivize insurers to improve
the practice assistance they provide in order to compete in the marketplace.
This type of risk and practice management guidance helps lawyers avoid and
address professional liability problems at the same time that it assists lawyers

85. In interviews with Connecticut lawyers, a “small number . . . reported that the process of
applying for . . . insurance positively affects their thinking or conduct.” Regulators at the Margins, supra
note 73, at 594. For example, one lawyer stated that the renewal process “makes us go and review the
[office] policies . . . and question whether or not there’s a more efficient way to do it, a safer way to do
it.” Id.
86. “The PLF stands at the vanguard as an innovative program for providing covered parties
with services and support in the most cost-effective, efficient, responsive, and responsible way
possible.” Bernick, supra note 5, at 2. Such assistance includes counseling on claims prevention as well
as assistance in claims repair to address the problem and get the matter back on track. Id.
87. “The PLF’s practice management advisors make over 250 office visits and answer over 750
informational calls annually, teach dozens of CLEs throughout the state, and publish nearly 400
practice aids.” Id. at 1. The PLF services include legal education, on-site practice management
assistance through the PLF Practice Management Advisor Program, and personal assistance through
the Oregon Attorney Assistance Program. See OR. STATE BAR PROF’L LIAB. FUND, 2017 ANNUAL
REPORT 3–4 (2017), https://www.osbplf.org/assets/documents/annual_reports/2017%20PLF%
20Annual%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/8GDR-UM9K] [hereinafter OREGON 2017 ANNUAL
REPORT] (noting 100% of the people who returned surveys were “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with
eight aspects of the Professional Management Assistance program).
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in discharging their duties to clients.88
Mandating insurance also incentivizes lawyers to take precautions to
minimize their malpractice exposure. Lawyers should invest in risk
management when they recognize that such efforts can help avoid claims
that would require them to pay deductibles and would negatively impact
future premiums.89
E. Improves Accessibility & Affordability
As noted above, the need for a source of affordable insurance first
prompted Oregon to implement a mandatory insurance program in the
1970s.90 Interestingly, market forces and lawyer self-interest sparked the
change.91
Since creation of the PLF in Oregon, all Oregon attorneys in private
practice have been charged an annual assessment. In 2019 the assessment
was $3,300.92 From 2012–2018, the assessment was $3,500 per Oregon
lawyer in private practice.93
Regardless of practice area, claims experience, or years of practice,
lawyers in private practice in Oregon pay the same assessment and obtain
basic coverage that includes $50,000 for defense costs and $300,000 for
indemnity and, if necessary, additional defense costs.94 By insuring all
lawyers, the Oregon fund has been able to spread the risk while keeping
costs down for all insured lawyers.95 All Oregon lawyers in private practice
obtain the primary coverage provided by the Oregon fund even if a lawyer
88. For example, one thorny ethical conundrum relates to lawyers’ duty to disclose professional
malpractice to their clients, see ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS & PROF ‘L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op.
481 (2018). Although this ABA Ethics Opinion provides some general guidance, lawyers would benefit
from expert guidance and a disinterested opinion in determining whether they have a duty to disclose
malpractice to clients given the particular facts and circumstances of representation.
89. Insurers can also incentivize risk management by providing premium discounts for certain
activities. See Regulators at the Margins, supra note 73, at 582 (noting a few underwriters offer a premium
discount to lawyers who participate in risk management or ethics programming).
90. Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 190–92 (providing historical background on the
establishment of the Oregon program).
91. Id. at 190.
92. See Oregon’s Professional Liability Fund, supra note 33 (stating the basic assessment for Oregon
lawyers).
93. OREGON 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at INTRODUCTION.
94. Bernick, supra note 5, at 4.
95. A mandatory state program saves expenses by eliminating broker commissions, marketing
costs, taxes, regulator fees, and required contributions to state guaranty funds. Cunitz, supra note 40,
at 646–48 (discussing a 1993 Report from the ABA National Legal Malpractice Conference).
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has a record of professional discipline or liability claims that make the lawyer
a high-risk insured.
Although the Oregon experience of relying on a state bar program to
provide quality coverage to all lawyers at an affordable premium may not
translate to other jurisdictions where the practicing private bar is
considerably larger, requiring insurance of all lawyers may positively impact
the affordability and accessibility of insurance through the private
marketplace.96 With more prospective insureds in the marketplace there
should be more competition among insurers, contributing to greater stability
in the insurance market, less restrictive coverage, and greater availability of
coverage.97
Mandating that lawyers carry insurance may also contribute to the
creation of special programs and risk retention groups. More state bar
associations may establish bar-affiliated companies to provide affordable
and accessible insurance. Specialty bar groups, such as the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, have developed programs where
association members can obtain a full-range of professional liability
insurance products.98 Such programs can be designed to meet the special
needs of members while improving the affordability and accessibility of
insurance.99
F. Avoids Shifting of Losses to Insured Lawyers
Uninsured lawyers also increase the malpractice exposure of insured
lawyers. Quite simply, if there are insured lawyers and uninsured lawyers
involved in representation, the insured lawyers will likely be the targets of
possible malpractice claims related to the representation, even if the insured
lawyers did not engage in misconduct.100 For example, an uninsured lawyer
96. See Bennett J. Wasserman & Krishna J. Shah, Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance: The Time
Has Come, 199 N.J. L.J., Jan. 14, 2010, at 1 (suggesting carriers would lower premiums because there
would be more revenue for carriers and competition for premium dollars).
97. Id.
98. See National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, COMPLETE EQUITY MKTS.,
http://cemins.com/attorneys/nacdl.php [http://perma.cc/HS2E-VFFU] (describing various
insurance products tailored to types of practice, including part-time and assigned counsel practices).
99. For example, the exoneration or “actual innocence” rule applicable in the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions significantly lowers malpractice exposure of criminal defense lawyers. The premiums for
an insurance product designed for criminal defense attorneys can reflect the lower risk of civil liability
claims against criminal defense lawyers.
100. See Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn Lease Simpson, O Brothers, O Sisters, Art Thou Insured?:
The Case for Mandatory Disclosure of Malpractice Insurance Coverage, PA. LAW., May–June 2002, at 28, 32
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may refer a matter to an insured lawyer. If the fee arrangement between the
uninsured and insured lawyers is not in proportion to the services provided
by each lawyer, state versions of ABA Model Rule 1.5(e) require that the
lawyers assume joint responsibility for the representation.101 The
comments to the rule clarify that “[j]oint responsibility for the
representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the
representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership.”102 In the
event of malpractice by the uninsured lawyer, such as failure to convey a
settlement offer to a jointly-represented client, the insured lawyer can face a
malpractice claim even though the insured did not commit malpractice.103
Requiring insurance for all private practitioners should help prevent
situations where uninsured lawyers commit malpractice and shift
responsibility to those lawyers who purchase insurance.
G. Helps Lawyers and Malpractice Victims Avoid Insurance Gaps
In the professional liability market, insurers initially offered the
“occurrence” policy form.104 Under an “occurrence” policy, an occurrence
during the policy period triggers coverage. Because of uncertainty
associated with predicting claims and losses that would be paid under
occurrence policies, insurers abandoned the occurrence policy form and
moved to the “claims-made” policy form.105 A claims-made policy typically
covers claims that are first made against an insured during the policy period,
regardless of when the incident giving rise to the claim actually occurred.106
The shift from occurrence policies to claims-made policy forms can
create gaps when lawyers do not understand that they must have a policy in
effect at a time a claim is made and reported. In particular, a coverage gap

(noting members of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Professional Liability Committee have seen
“responsible attorneys who are drawn into malpractice suits because another attorney involved in the
matter proved to be uninsured”).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019).
102. Id. cmt. 7. For a discussion of joint responsibility under ABA Model Rule 1.5, the
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers and related caselaw, see Susan Saab Fortney & Vincent R.
Johnson, Legal Malpractice, in LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION § 5–7.3(a)(1) (2018) [hereinafter LEGAL ETHICS].
103. Although the insured lawyer may pursue a contribution claim, such a claim may not result
in any recovery if the other lawyer is uninsured and does not own sufficient non-exempt assets.
104. INSURANCE PURCHASING GUIDE, supra note 44, § 2:28.
105. See id. (explaining the claims-made form provides insurers more underwriting certainty and
the ability to better control their losses).
106. Id. §§ 2:31, 2:32.
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may occur when a lawyer switches law firms. Insurers may rely on a number
of policy provisions to clarify that the policy will only cover claims related
to work performed while working at the named insured firm.107 This can
create a coverage gap for the lateral lawyer who joins a firm if the lawyer’s
former firm does not have a policy in effect at the time the claim is made.108
When I was in private practice handling legal malpractice coverage matters,
I was surprised to learn how many lawyers did not focus on the limitations
under their insurance policies. If insurance is required, lawyers would have
to certify that they have a policy in effect. This would effectively force
lawyers to understand the terms of their policy and to obtain coverage to
protect themselves and persons they injure.
In short, mandating insurance serves the regulatory functions of the law
of lawyering by providing access to remedies and providing incentives for
lawyers to obtain insurance to protect themselves and persons they injure,
while improving their practices. Although the most compelling justification
relates to public protection, the discussion above also reveals that a
mandatory scheme can positively impact the individual lawyers, the legal
profession, and the quality of legal services.
III. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO MANDATORY INSURANCE
A pattern of arguments emerges in reviewing commentary and reports
that oppose requiring that private practitioners maintain professional
liability insurance. Although many of these arguments focus on the impact
on lawyers who are required to purchase insurance, some arguments are
framed in terms of the public good. The discussion below reviews some of
the most common arguments asserted by those who oppose mandating
insurance.109
107. Susan Saab Fortney, Insurance Issues Related to Lateral Hire Musical Chairs, 2000 PROF. LAW.
65, 70–71 (discussing the different approaches that insurers use to limit coverage to claims related to
legal services performed at the law firm that is named as the insured under the policy).
108. Id. at 70. Typically, a former lawyer will be covered under the former firm’s policy for
claims related to legal services performed at the former firm. The complication and possible gap occurs
when the former firm does not carry insurance at the time the claim is made. A gap can also occur
when a law firm dissolves without adequate tail coverage. For a discussion of post-dissolution risks,
see ROBERT W. HILLMAN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 4.11.3
(3d ed. Supp. 2018). The authors note that it is unlikely that lawyers are taking steps to insure against
the post-dissolution malpractice risks because most lawyers are “unaware of the possibility of postdissolution liabilities” Id. § 4.11.2.
109. Those who oppose insurance also identify various logistics issues that will not be addressed
by this article.
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A. No Proof of Harm
As a starting point, opponents maintain that there is no demonstrated
need for requiring that lawyers carry professional liability insurance. Simply
stated, they assert that the proponents have failed to establish that the public
is harmed by the status quo in the vast majority of jurisdictions where
insurance is not required for lawyers in private law practice. Rather than
conceding that there is a public protection problem, some bar groups and
leaders have concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support
mandating insurance.110 This is the position recently taken by the New
Jersey State Bar Association in recommending that the New Jersey Supreme
Court reject a mandatory insurance requirement because there is “no
evidence that . . .[such a] requirement is necessary or will resolve any
demonstrated problem in connection with the ability of consumers to obtain
quality legal services and to have recourse available in the event of negligent
representation.”111
The argument that there is no proof of harm refers to the lack of
“statistics” demonstrating that the existence of uninsured attorneys results
in uncompensated claims.112 This argument does not recognize data
available on unsatisfied judgments against lawyers and the significant
percentage of lawyers practicing law without insurance. In an article
reporting on her empirical study on uninsured lawyers, Professor Levin
devotes nine pages to addressing the “no harm” argument.113 She
concludes, “[T]here is evidence that clients of uninsured lawyers are being
harmed by their lawyer’s malpractice, clients are not always compensated for
the harm, and sometimes clients suffer substantial harm.”114
Although it is difficult to discern the extent to which there are unsatisfied
judgments against uninsured lawyers, there are numerous media stories
reporting on unsatisfied judgments. In her article based on an empirical
study of uninsured lawyers, Professor Levin cited numerous news stories
referring to cases around the U.S. where plaintiffs obtained uncollectible
110. See, e.g., John Schlegelmilch, Insufficient Evidence to Support Mandatory Malpractice Insurance
Requirements, NEV. LAW., June 2000, at 9, 9 (referring to “the complete lack of empirical data supporting
the need for mandatory malpractice insurance”).
111. NJSB Comments, supra note 17, at 1.
112. “Given the lack of statistics, it is not possible to determine the extent of public harm
occurring, if any, due to the absence of mandatory insurance, and no way to measure the benefit of
requiring insurance.” NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 18, at 50.
113. Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1309–17.
114. Id. at 1316.
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judgments against uninsured attorneys.115 These judgments ranged from
amounts as small $25,000 in one case to $10 million in another case.116 In
Virginia, where lawyers must report unsatisfied judgments against them, ten
lawyers indicated that they had unsatisfied judgments in 2015 and six of
those were uninsured.117
These cases only represent a sliver of the number of victims injured by
uninsured lawyers because malpractice claims against uninsured lawyers are
very rarely pursued. Data collected by empirical scholars in two different
studies reveal that it is very difficult for a victim to retain counsel to handle
a legal malpractice matter on a contingency fee.118
When cases are not brought because the target is uninsured, we cannot
establish with certainty the extent of the harm caused by uninsured lawyers.
We do have one empirical scholar’s estimate of harm caused by uninsured
lawyers. Based on available claims data in Missouri, Professor Levin
extrapolated from the Missouri data to estimate that the total indemnity
payment for solo and small firm lawyers was—very roughly—$260 million
annually.119 Assuming that 25% of all solo and small firm lawyers are
uninsured nationwide, she concludes that tens of millions more dollars
would be paid annually to compensate the clients of uninsured lawyers for
malpractice if their lawyers were insured.120
When evaluating the risk of harm, the number of uninsured lawyers and
their practice settings should be considered. Although there are not national
115. Id. at 1314–15, 1317 n.196.
116. Id.
117. “Some uninsured lawyers have more than one unsatisfied malpractice judgment against
them.” See id. at 1314.
118. See KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 148 (reporting their study results that revealed
that members of the plaintiff’s bar were reluctant to pursue claims against uninsured lawyers). The
following describes what Professor Levin learned in her interviews with six attorneys who devote
substantial time to plaintiffs’ malpractice work:
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers will “absolutely never” take such cases, at least on a contingent fee basis.
If plaintiffs’ malpractice lawyers discover that a lawyer is uninsured during the representation,
some drop the case if there are no substantial assets. One such lawyer, who encounters two to
three cases a year in which he learns after the lawsuit commences that the lawyer is uninsured,
noted, “It has gotten to the place where I tell clients up front that if it turns out their lawyer is
uninsured, I will have to send the case elsewhere or drop the claim. It does not make sense to
chase lawyers for their condos and BMWs. They will file for bankruptcy.”
Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1313 (quoting a Telephone Interview with Plaintiff’s Attorney
No. 5 (May 6, 2015)).
119. Id. at 1311.
120. Id. at 1312.
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numbers available, data from individual states does reveal the percentage of
uninsured lawyers in those particular states. Available survey data indicate
that there is a significant percentage of lawyers practicing without insurance,
ranging from 6% in South Dakota to 36% in Texas.121 Uninsured lawyers
are predominately in solo practice or firms of five or fewer lawyers.122
These uninsured lawyers may represent individuals and small businesses.123
This suggests that the clients of the uninsured will likely be infrequent users
of legal services and may be the most vulnerable when lawyers commit
malpractice. At that point the malpractice victim will likely need to hire a
plaintiff’s attorney who will handle the matter on a contingent fee basis. As
noted above, qualitative data support the conclusion that the malpractice
victims will not be able to retain such counsel when the wrongdoer is
uninsured. This harm to individual consumers may not be quantifiable but
deserves special note because personal service clients are the least prepared
to protect themselves and most directly impacted by uncompensated
losses.124
Finally, there is the personal face of harm experienced by clients injured
by uninsured lawyers. In an open letter to the Nevada Supreme Court and
Board of Governors, a Nevada litigator shared his experiences in counseling
two personal injury clients, one of whom had lost a leg and another who
suffered from life-long disabilities and pain.125 Both had their cases
dismissed because the attorney failed to timely serve the complaints in the
personal injury actions. Because of the malpractice, the clients lost their
underlying personal injury cases, leaving millions in uncompensated
damages. Because the lawyer was uninsured and had no collectible assets,
the clients were left without recovery. In cases such as these, the lawyer’s
negligence not only “deprives . . . [the] client of property or rights to which
he would otherwise be entitled under applicable law, [but also] damage is
121. For a table outlining available data, see KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 41.
122. See id. at 41–42 (discussing the practice setting of uninsured lawyers). According to the
Washington Task Force Report, 14% of all Washington lawyers in private practice consistently report
being uninsured, but 28% of those in solo or small firms reported being uninsured. WASHINGTON
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 11.
123. “[S]ome unknown but probably substantial proportion of lawyers working in personal
services sector forgoes insurance.” KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 92.
124. See id. at 168–69 (summarizing findings related to the differences between the corporate
and personal services hemispheres and the ability of personal service clients to obtain redress).
125. Robert T. Eglet, An Open Letter to the Nevada Supreme Court & the Board of Governors on the
State Bar of Nevada, VEGAS LEGAL MAG., https://www.vegaslegalmagazine.com/nevada-supremecourt-board-of-governors/ [http://perma.cc/BP8A-EPTX].
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done . . . to the societal objectives embodied in the substantive rule and to
the capacity of the legal system as a dispute-solving mechanism.”126
B. Invites Litigation
Those who support and oppose mandatory insurance may agree on one
point: the insurance status of a lawyer will affect the odds that a malpractice
lawyer will pursue a claim. It is undeniable that existence of insurance
improves the likelihood that the lawyer will be sued. This is where the
proponents and opponents part ways.
Proponents focus on the impact on the injured person, arguing that
without insurance, most victims are denied access. Stated differently, public
protection is advanced if mandatory insurance increases the possibility that
injured persons will be able to retain counsel to pursue actions with the
prospect of recovery.127
Those who oppose mandatory insurance focus on the impact on lawyers,
maintaining that insurance effectively puts a target on the lawyers back.
They may believe that “going bare” and “making their pockets shallow” is
an effective and ethical loss prevention strategy.128 Without malpractice
insurance to cover losses, some may also shelter non-exempt assets that
would be subject to execution in the unlikely event of a malpractice
action.129 Lawyers who use such tactics do not appear to differentiate
between meritorious and frivolous claims, apparently believing that it
appropriate to take action to avoid responsibility for malpractice losses.
A related argument against mandatory insurance is that it will lead to more
frivolous claims.130 Persons who take this position may not recognize or
acknowledge that the economics and common law rules related to legal
malpractice claims present significant challenges for persons injured by
lawyers’ conduct.131
126. Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE. L.J. 590, 592 (1973).
127. See infra Part II, Section A (discussing public protection and access to remedies).
128. But see Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1324 (suggesting it would be a “perverse
outcome, however, to allow these lawyers to reduce their chances of being sued by declining to
purchase insurance that would compensate clients if the lawyers commit malpractice”).
129. “The failure to purchase insurance is especially concerning when some uninsured lawyers
use their legal knowledge to shelter their assets.” Id.
130. E.g., Harry H. Schneider Jr., Mandatory Malpractice Insurance: No: An Invitation to Frivolous
Suits, ABA J., Nov. 1993, at 44, 45.
131. For an article that focuses on the various challenges that victims must overcome in
commencing a legal malpractice case, trying the case, and recovering judgement, see Tort in Search of a
Remedy, supra note 49.
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To commence a legal malpractice action an injured person typically will
seek representation. Because of the costs and complexity associated with
legal malpractice actions, experienced plaintiffs’ counsel screen
engagements carefully, declining claims that are unmeritorious, unprovable,
or where the amount of damages do not justify moving forward.132
Because of defendant-friendly rules related to malpractice cases, it is very
difficult for plaintiffs to carry the burden of proof on each element of a
negligence claim.133 Most notably, proving causation with the trial-withina-trial presents a serious obstacle that many injured persons will not be able
to overcome.134 Other rules related to the case-in-chief and affirmative
defenses also protect lawyers.135
Lawyers who understand what is necessary to prove malpractice claims
should be less concerned about insurance inviting frivolous litigation. To
help lawyers better understand their malpractice exposure, bar associations
could educate lawyers on challenges that plaintiffs face in pursuing and
recovering on legal malpractice claims. More information on the showing
necessary to prevail on a legal malpractice claim should help lawyers take
measures to limit their exposure while, at the same time, deal with concerns
related to insurance inviting frivolous claims.
To further address the concern that mandatory insurance would invite
frivolous litigation, a jurisdiction could raise the threshold for filing a legal
malpractice claim. One approach to doing so is to require that plaintiff file
an expert’s affidavit of merit within a certain period of time after the
commencement of litigation.136 In connection with tort reform related to
medical malpractice litigation, a number of states adopted statutory
requirements requiring that complaints against professionals be supported
by expert affidavits.137 Some states expressly require such affidavits for
132. See id. at 2039–41 (reviewing factors that plaintiffs’ counsel consider in evaluating
malpractice cases); see also KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 42, at 143–50 (discussing interview
responses related to the screening factors that plaintiffs’ lawyers used in evaluating legal malpractice
claims).
133. Tort in Search of a Remedy, supra note 49, at 2042; see generally Vincent R. Johnson, Causation
and “Legal Certainty” in Legal Malpractice Law, 8 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 374, 374 (2018)
(arguing “judicial references to legal certainty are ambiguous and threaten to undermine the fairness of
legal malpractice litigation”).
134. See Tort in Search of a Remedy, supra note 49, at 2043–48 (discussing the trial-within-a-trial
hurdle and causation in civil litigation, transactional matters and criminal cases).
135. See id. at 2048–51 (identifying common rules on recovering types of damages and attorneys’
fees, as well as affirmative defenses that enable lawyers to escape or limit their liability).
136. LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW, supra note 84, at 78.
137. LEGAL MALPRACTICE TREATISE, supra note 26, § 37:62.
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legal malpractice cases.138 Although the procedural and substantive
requirements for these requirements vary,139 such affidavits can be used to
both deter and dismiss frivolous professional liability claims. Imposing such
an affidavit requirement may be a reasonable approach to deal with lawyer
concerns related to mandatory insurance and frivolous litigation, while
providing protection to injured persons who can prove their legitimate
claims.
C. Cost and Impact on Legal Fees
The largest percentage of uninsured respondents refer to “cost” when
identifying reasons why they do not carry lawyers’ professional liability
insurance (LPL). The following summarizes the findings from surveys of
uninsured lawyers in New Mexico, Arizona and Connecticut:
In all three of these jurisdictions, annual LPL premiums for solo and small
firm practitioners cost around $3,000 per lawyer for minimum levels of
coverage ($100,000/$300,000). LPL insurance is a deductible business
expense. Nevertheless, uninsured New Mexico lawyers most frequently cited
cost as the reason for not carrying malpractice insurance. In the other two
states, uninsured lawyers most frequently cited unaffordability as the reason:
Among the uninsured Arizona and Connecticut lawyers, 65% and 58%
responded, respectively, that one of the reasons they did not carry LPL
insurance was because they could not afford it.140

As suggested in this excerpt, lawyers often refer to “cost” or “affordability”
as a reason for not buying insurance but may not actually know the relatively
reasonable cost of purchasing insurance in their jurisdictions. For example,
New Mexico lawyers most frequently cited cost as the reason for not
carrying malpractice insurance, but 40.8% of the uninsured lawyers in
private practice reported that they had never applied for insurance.141
Another telling result was that 53% of the New Mexico uninsured lawyers
“strongly agreed” or “agreed” that they would purchase insurance if the

138. LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 102, § 5–2.2(f)(3).
139. See LEGAL MALPRACTICE TREATISE, supra note 26, § 37:63 (reviewing jurisdictional
variations and attempts by plaintiffs to avoid application of the requirement).
140. Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1290 (footnotes omitted). “Among the fifteen Arizona
lawyers who had never been insured, seven had never communicated with an insurance agent, broker,
or underwriter about the possibility of obtaining LPL insurance.” Id.
141. Id.
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New Mexico Supreme Court required them to do so.142 This suggests that
some respondents may conflate “cost” and “affordability.” Evidently,
lawyers who can afford to purchase insurance do not see it as a cost of
practicing law, unless insurance is required by the regulator.
The recent experience in implementing an insurance requirement in
Idaho suggests that objections based on cost are overstated. The
Executive Director of the Idaho State Bar reported that no premium quote
had exceeded $3,500, although some lawyers expressed concern about the
cost.143 In her study of uninsured lawyers, Professor Levin learned that
some lawyers with marginal or not very profitable practices genuinely could
not pay for insurance.144 If required to purchase insurance these lawyers
would need assistance on law practice management to determine if they
could improve the profitability of their practices or could be forced to find
other positions.
Some attorneys concerned about cost may be practicing on a part-time
basis. These attorneys may be able to purchase part-time policies with very
reasonable premiums.145 Undeniably, if insurance is required, some lawyers
who currently practice on a part-time basis may retire if the cost of insurance
is more than the revenue from occasional legal work.146
Another critique is that mandatory insurance could contribute to
increases in legal fees lawyers charge.147 This argument assumes that the
lawyer will pass the cost of insurance on to clients. This is not the only
option available to lawyers. Without increasing fees, a lawyer could elect to
work more hours (assuming that the lawyer has enough business to generate
additional income) or a lawyer may absorb the cost of insurance (effectively
adjusting annual income).
Because uninsured lawyers are predominately in solo and small firm
practice, data on lawyers’ income shed light on the ability of lawyers to
purchase insurance and not raise legal fees. Although the findings of these
142. Id. at 1291.
143. Idaho Presentation, supra note 3, at 3.
144. Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at 1292.
145. “In some states, part-time lawyers (working fewer than 25 hours per week) can obtain LPL
insurance for $600 per year or less.” Id. at 1320.
146. See Uninsured Lawyers, supra note 23, at 36–37 (noting some uninsured lawyers that were
semi-retired cited “cost” as a reason for not maintaining insurance but reported that they could afford
to purchase insurance if required to do so).
147. See NJSB Comments, supra note 17, at 2 (asserting “any increase due to the mandatory nature
of the coverage might be passed onto clients. . . . [And] could make legal services even more out of
reach for those who need them the most”).
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surveys and analyses of data on the income of solo lawyers have been
debated, data reveal that lawyers at the higher percentiles of income should
be able to more comfortably pay insurance premiums than those in the
lower quartiles.148 For those in the lower quartiles, the cost of insurance
may be more of a hardship without an increase in legal fees.
For those lawyers who determine that they cannot afford to purchase
insurance without increasing fees, the amount of the actual increase will
depend on a number of factors, including the type of fee and the number of
hours that lawyers work. Even if we assume that the average lawyer bills
only 2.4 hours a day, as one study has suggested, the amount of increased
legal fees would be $6.07 per hour to cover a $3,500 insurance premium if
the lawyer works forty-eight weeks per year.149
Depending on their circumstances and means, consumers may be willing
to pay higher fees for a lawyer who is insured. In a 2018 survey conducted
by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, 78%
of California residents indicated that legal malpractice insurance should be
required for lawyers to practice in California.150 Of those respondents,
86% believed that lawyers should be required to carry insurance even if

148. Data and analyses of income reported by solo and small firm lawyers vary a great deal. For
example, according to an online survey by the Martindale Legal Marketing Network, solo and small
firm lawyers made an average of $198,000 in 2017, while the median earning amount was $140,000.
Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Earnings for Solo and Small-Firm Lawyers Was Nearly $200K Last Year, Report
Says, ABA J. (May 22, 2018, 3:17 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/average_earnings_
for_solo_and_small_firm_lawyers_was_nearly_200k_last_year [http://perma.cc/7D8U-S7RX]. By
contrast, Professor Benjamin H. Barton identified Internal Revenue data indicating that the average
income for solos was slightly more than $49,000 in 2012. See Debra Cassesns Weiss, How Much Do Solo
Lawyers Make? More Than IRS Data Suggests, Law Profs Assert, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2016, 7:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_much_do_solo_lawyers_make_more_than_irs_data
_suggests_law_profs_assert/ [http://perma.cc/43LR-H4AT] (discussing the debate related to
calculating average earnings for solo lawyers). Amounts earned may also vary depending on the state
of residence. For example, the following sets forth the results for income reported by the 1,530 fulltime solo lawyers who responded to the Texas survey conducted in 2016: the twenty-fifth percentile
was $65,000, the fiftieth percentile was $105,000, and the seventy-fifth percentile was $175,000. Milan
Markovic & Gabriele Plickert, Results of the 2016 Texas Lawyer Study, TEX. A&M SCH. OF L.
http://tamulawyerstudy.org/results/#gf_1 [http://perma.cc/2KY5-DQX3].
149. The 2.4 per day figure is based on a 2018 CLIO study that found an average lawyer
dedicates 2.4 hours to billable work per day. CLIO, LEGAL TRENDS REPORT 2018 10,
https://www.clio.com/resources/legal-trends/ [http://perma.cc/ZE2V-PT7E].
150. NORC AT UNIV. OF CHI., LEGAL MALPRACTICE 2018 CALIFORNIA STATE BAR
AMERISPEAK FIELD REPORT (Dec. 13, 2018). The NORC results reflected opinions of 1,038 adults
who were selected using sampling strata. Id.
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lawyers would charge higher fees to cover insurance premiums.151
If a lawyer is practicing in a high risk and high premium area such as
securities law, that lawyer’s fees may reflect the cost of services. If the fees
do not and the uninsured securities lawyer is charging less than insured
lawyers, any increase in fees to cover insurance costs could eliminate the
competitive advantage of uninsured lawyers who appear to be charging less
for comparable services.
D. Impact on Pro Bono, Low Bono Representation
Some lawyers maintain that requiring insurance will adversely impact pro
bono representation. Lawyers interested in providing such services may be
able to identify legal services or bar programs that provide insurance
coverage to volunteers who handle pro bono cases under the umbrella of
the programs.152 If a state mandates insurance coverage for private
practitioners, the insurance provided by the legal services or bar
organization should satisfy the state requirement for lawyers who only
represent pro bono clients under the organization’s sponsorship.. If the
lawyer’s other representation of clients is limited, the lawyer may seek a parttime policy available from some insurers.
The Washington Task Force Report discusses various insurance options
for lawyers providing primarily pro bono services.153 The report notes that
56% of Washington lawyers “are connected to their pro bono clients
through referrals from legal aid providers, non-profit organizations, or bar
association or other independent pro bono programs,” many of which are
“required to either provide malpractice insurance for their volunteers or
have a policy in place to require that all volunteers carry their own
malpractice insurance.”154 Recognizing that there are some gaps in the
availability of insurance for lawyers providing pro bono representation in
Washington, the Washington Task Force Report recommends that the
151. When asked if they would vote in favor of a proposed law requiring lawyers to have legal
malpractice insurance, 72% indicated that they would be in favor of mandatory insurance if it would
result in lawyers raising their hourly fees by $10 and 60% would be in favor of mandatory insurance if
it would result in lawyers raising their hourly fees by $30. “Overall, 57% of respondents would support
such a law, despite an increase in costs.” CALIFORNIA WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
152. According to the ABA Standards for Programs Providing Civil Pro Bono Legal Service to
Persons of Limited Means, “A pro bono program should obtain professional liability insurance for
itself, its staff and its volunteers.” ABA, STANDARDS FOR PROGRAMS PROVIDING CIVIL PRO BONO
LEGAL SERVICES TO PERSONS OF LIMITED MEANS STANDARD 4.6, at 7 (AM. B. ASS’N 2013).
153. WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 17–19.
154. Id. at 17–18.
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Washington State Bar Association “develop and put into effect an improved
statewide program to increase access to malpractice insurance for lawyers
whose private practices are limited solely to pro bono representations.”155
Other bodies recommending mandatory insurance should follow
Washington’s lead in evaluating and addressing issues related to the
availability of insurance for lawyers providing pro bono representation.
Lawyers handling matters on a reduced fee basis should study their
business model to determine how they can cover insurance costs. Guidance
is available from experts, such as directors of legal incubators, who can assist
lawyers in determining how to develop personal and professional budgets
to cover their costs, including insurance, while continuing to provide
representation to persons of modest means.156
E. Philosophical Objections
Some commentators question the manner in which a mandatory
insurance regime would encroach on bars’ autonomy and cede too much
power to insurance companies.157 The argument is that insurers through
their underwriting and pricing can effectively determine who practices
law.158
Given the degree to which insurers compete for business in a soft market,
this concern appears to be unfounded. Even in harder insurance markets,
lawyers who encounter difficulty in securing insurance should be provided
the opportunity to obtain coverage from an assigned risk pool.
Interestingly, after Idaho adopted the rule requiring insurance, no lawyer

155. Id. at 53.
156. For a very helpful article on the importance and sustainability of low bono law practices,
see Luz E. Herrera, Encouraging the Development of “Low Bono” Law Practices, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 3 (2014). Dean Herrera’s article includes budget illustrations that
factor in the cost of malpractice insurance. Id. at 14. Some incubator programs designed for law school
graduates starting their own practices require that incubator attorneys obtain malpractice insurance.
For examples, the Los Angeles Incubator Consortium requires incubator participants to carry
insurance, but the organization does not provide it to them. See Lawyer Incubator Profiles, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/program_main/pr
ogram_profiles/#laconsortium [http://perma.cc/22M3-BFRV].
157. For a review brief discussion of lawyers’ objections based on autonomy, see Jacob. J. (Jake)
Key, Analyzing the Oregon Model: The Pros and Cons of Requiring Attorneys in Private Practice to Maintain
Malpractice Insurance, 19 W. MICH. U. COOLEY. J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 163, 177–78 (2017).
158. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 130, at 45 (warning mandatory malpractice insurance
“effectively defers to the insurer . . . the ultimate decision as to who will, and who will not, be permitted
to practice law”).
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reported an inability to purchase insurance, although some indicated that
the requirement will affect their decision to retire from practice.159
Some fiercely independent lawyers resent being required to purchase
malpractice insurance. They may believe that they practice safely and that
they should be able to self-insure. One approach to addressing this concern
is to give lawyers an option of maintaining the minimum amount of
insurance required or proof of financial responsibility. This possibility is
discussed in the next section dealing with alternatives to mandatory
malpractice insurance.160
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES DEALING WITH RISKS
POSED BY UNINSURED LAWYERS
Rather than requiring that all practitioners maintain malpractice
insurance, three different approaches have been used in the U.S. to address
specific risks posed by uninsured lawyers: mandatory disclosure of insurance
status, compulsory risk management training, and proof of financial
responsibility. Each of the alternatives has its advantages and limitations.
A. Insurance Disclosure Rules
The most common alternative to mandatory insurance has been for states
to adopt disclosure rules that require uninsured lawyers to disclose their
insurance status. These disclosure rules are intended to address the
asymmetry between lawyers and consumers related to information on the
lawyer carrying insurance.161 The lack of insurance is clearly material
information because surveys reveal that nonlawyers mistakenly believe that
all lawyers are insured.162 Many of the same public protection arguments
that are made in favor of mandatory malpractice insurance apply to

159. In a presentation to the WSBA Task Force on February 21, 2018, Diane Minnich,
Executive Director of the Idaho State Bar stated that “so far no lawyer has been categorically unable
to obtain insurance.” Idaho Presentation, supra note 3, at 3.
160. In other situations, in which insurance is required, lawyers may maintain proof of financial
responsibility rather than purchasing insurance. For example, an Illinois rule allows lawyers to practice
in limited liability firms provided that they maintain insurance or proof of financial responsibility in the
amount set forth in the rule. ILL. S. CT. R. 722 (eff. Mar. 15, 2004).
161. For a discussion of how disclosure of the lack of insurance helps bridge the information
gap, see Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 197–98.
162. See Uninsured Lawyers, supra note 23, at 38 (citing a Virginia State Bar Association Report
on Study Undertaken By Client Protection Subcommittee of the Special Committee on Lawyers
Malpractice Insurance 2005–2006).
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mandatory insurance rules.163
Twenty-four states have adopted some form of disclosure of a lawyer’s
insurance status.164 By adopting these rules, states took the middle ground
between continuing the status quo and implementing mandatory
insurance.165 Rather than requiring all lawyers to maintain minimum levels
of insurance, disclosure balances lawyer autonomy and client protection.
Lawyers have the choice to decide to purchase insurance, understanding that
they must disclose their lack of insurance to clients. When lawyers elect not
to purchase and make the required disclosure, consumers are (theoretically)
provided information before hiring counsel.166 Assuming that consumers
obtain the information at the time that they are selecting counsel, they can
decide between lawyers who purchase insurance as a safety net and lawyers
who go bare.167
Although disclosure rules do not directly reduce the risk of asset
insufficiency, such rules may reduce the number of uninsured lawyers. To
avoid having to disclose their lack of insurance, lawyers may purchase
insurance. In this sense, disclosure rules incentivize lawyers to buy
insurance.
To determine whether disclosure rules have actually impacted the number
of uninsured lawyers, Professor Levin systematically examined the number
163. A number of practitioner and student articles have examined whether lawyers should be
required to disclose to clients whether they carry insurance. See Farbod Solaimani, Current
Development, Watching the Client’s Back: A Defense of Mandatory Insurance Disclosure Laws, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 963, 964 (2006) (arguing for modifications to the disclosure rule to balance the
professional interests of attorneys and consumer protection); see also Jeffrey D. Watters, What They Don’t
Know Can Hurt Them: Why Clients Should Know if Their Attorney Does Not Carry Malpractice Insurance,
62 BAYLOR L. REV. 245, 250 (2010) (suggesting Texas adopt a dual-disclosure rule, requiring disclosure
to both clients and the state bar); James C. Gallagher, Should Lawyers be Required to Disclose Whether They
Have Malpractice Insurance?, VT. B. J., Summer 2006, at 5, 5 (analyzing considerations as to Vermont’s
possible adoption of disclosure requirement); James E. Towery, The Case in Favor of Mandatory Disclosure
of Lack of Malpractice Insurance, VT. B. J., Fall 2007, at 35, 35 (advocating the adoption of a disclosure
requirement as an obligation owed by attorneys pursuant to their license).
164. For background information on state rules and a Model ABA Court Rule on insurance
disclosure, see Law as a Profession, supra note 21, at 193–96.
165. Id. at 193.
166. The actual receipt of information depends on whether the rule requires that prospective
clients be directly provided information, as opposed to the information being available on regulators’
websites.
167. Some suggest that lawyers who “go bare” may have a greater incentive to avoid liability
because they have personal liability rather than insurance protection. Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 156.
The problem with this proposition is that lawyers who go bare likely know that the lack of insurance
significantly lowers the likelihood of them being sued.
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of uninsured lawyers in states with disclosure rules.168 Based on the limited
available data, she concluded that it is difficult to assess whether disclosure
requirements have had a significant effect on the purchase of LPL
insurance.169 The following describes her findings on two states with rules
requiring direct disclosure to clients:
The biggest success story may be South Dakota, where 94% of lawyers who
engage in private practice in the state carry LPL insurance. This state also has
the most demanding direct disclosure requirements. After South Dakota
required uninsured lawyers to directly disclose their lack of insurance to clients
in all written communications and advertising, the percentage of insured
lawyers practicing in the state reportedly reached a high of 96%. . . . The state
did not, however, gather data concerning the percentage of uninsured lawyers
before 1990, when it adopted the direct disclosure requirement, so it is not
possible to determine whether the percentage of uninsured lawyers
significantly decreased thereafter.
It may not be a coincidence, however, that Pennsylvania—which requires
direct disclosure to clients and posts lawyers’ LPL insurance information on a
website—reports the next highest rate of insured lawyers in private practice
(93.1%).170

Unlike South Dakota and Pennsylvania, New Mexico did not appear to
have a significant reduction in the number of uninsured lawyers after
adopting a direct disclosure rule.171 Professor Levin concludes that there
is also “little evidence that uninsured lawyers are motivated to purchase LPL
insurance simply because state regulators post their lack of insurance
coverage on an official website.”172
After examining the impact on the percentage of uninsured lawyers,
Professor Levin turns to the limits of the disclosure, starting with the
effectiveness of informing consumers of the lack of insurance.173 Even
with direct disclosure to consumers, she notes that it is unclear whether
clients actually read the information or fully understand the implications of

168. For the study results and related analysis, see Lawyers Going Bare, supra note 41, at
1296–1309.
169. Id. at 1303.
170. Id. at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 1306.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1325.
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their lawyers being uninsured.174 She also notes that the timing of the
disclosure may be problematic because the disclosure typically comes after
the consumer has decided to engage the lawyer.175 “Cognitive biases may
also make it difficult for a client to change course once a decision to retain
a lawyer is made.”176
To address the concerns and better empower consumers to make
informed choices, Professor Levin makes a number of recommendations
for disclosure requirements to provide “meaningful information to the
public before the client makes the decision to retain a lawyer.”177 This
would include direct disclosure to clients, as well as disclosure on the
lawyer’s website and in written communications with potential clients.178
In order for consumers to find information on a lawyer’s insurance status
before contacting a prospective lawyer, she also recommends that state
regulators make such information accessible through a simple internet
search.179 Regulators and bar groups interested in implementing
meaningful disclosure rules that help bridge the information gap between
consumers and clients, should make changes recommended by
Professor Levin.
Even with improved disclosure rules, decision makers interested in public
protection should recognize the disclosure rules are largely limited to
providing information to prospective clients. From the standpoint of
information asymmetry, this is a good thing. However, if the primary goal
is to reduce the number of uninsured lawyers, it is unclear the extent to
which a disclosure requirement incentivizes uninsured lawyers to purchase
insurance.180
Moreover, disclosure rules may provide no information or protection to
nonclients who are victims of malpractice. Most often, the discourse on
legal malpractice and insurance focuses on clients, without recognizing that
some of the most serious malpractice claims involve nonclient victims.181
Therefore, from the standpoint of public protection, both clients and

174. Id.
175. Id. at 1326.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1328.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See infra notes 168–72.
181. For an overview of liability claims brought by nonclients, see LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW,
supra note 84, at 179–258.
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nonclients who are injured by uninsured lawyers would be better protected
through a mandatory insurance rule.
B. Proof of Financial Responsibility
The second alternative to requiring insurance is to give lawyers the option
to provide proof of financial responsibility as an alternative to malpractice
insurance. In this context, proof of financial responsibility refers to
specifically segregated and designated funds to satisfy a malpractice
judgement.182 Although there is no assurance that the insurance proceeds
or segregated funds will completely cover the plaintiff’s losses, the funds
provide a protected source of recovery and minimum level of protection for
persons injured by the acts or omissions of a lawyer.
A few states allow for the use of proof of responsibility in connection
with practice in limited liability firms. When enacting statutes or rules that
allow lawyers to limit their liability for vicarious liability claims, some
jurisdictions included insurance requirements. These requirements were
intended to address public protection concerns related to the ability of a
plaintiff to recover in the event of a malpractice judgment.183 For those
lawyers who wanted to convert to a limited liability firm, but did not want
to purchase insurance, some state provisions allow lawyers to provide proof
of financial responsibility as an alternative to insurance.
Statutes will indicate the type of proof required as well as the amount of
funds. For example, the Illinois rule requires that the amount of funds be
in a sum no less than the required annual aggregate for minimum insurance.
Because the Illinois minimum annual aggregate for firms in Illinois is
$250,000 times the number of lawyers in the firm, the amount of designated
or segregated funds is a large sum for firms of any size.184
Unlike insurance policies with an expense-within-limits feature, the
amount of the segregated or designated funds would not be reduced for
defense costs.185 As compared to insurance where coverage may be
disputed or denied by the insurer, with proof of responsibility the
182. INSURANCE PURCHASING GUIDE, supra note 44, §§ 16–17.
183. See Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences—The Traps
of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 729–30 (1997) (“[L]egislatively mandated
insurance addresses the concern that the elimination of vicarious liability leaves malpractice plaintiffs
without recovery in the event of a judgment.”).
184. ILL. S. CT. R. 722 (eff. Mar. 15, 2004).
185. Policies that include an expense-within-limit provision require that defense costs be
deducted from the limits of liability. Legal Malpractice Insurance, supra note 44, at 48.
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malpractice plaintiff should have a source of recovery, provided that the
funds are safely segregated and designated for payment in the event of a
malpractice judgment.
Although it is doubtful that many lawyers would elect to rely on the proof
of financial responsibility in lieu of purchasing insurance, it is an option for
those persons who want to self-insure. From the standpoint of public
protection, it should address the same issue of asset insufficiency, providing
an amount that can be tapped in the event of a malpractice judgment.
Therefore, any mandatory insurance regime requiring lawyers to purchase
insurance in the open market should include the proof of responsibility
option.
C. Proactive Management-Based Regulation
A third approach to dealing with concerns related to uninsured lawyers is
to use proactive regulation. Proactive regulation refers to approaches and
programs that seek to prevent lawyer regulatory and service problems from
occurring, rather than dealing with alleged misconduct after complaints are
filed.186 Proactive regulatory measures that promote ethical law practice by
assisting lawyers with practice management are referred to as proactive,
management-based regulation (PMBR).187
The development of PMBR can be traced to initiatives to liberalize the
business structures available to Australian lawyers.188 New South Wales
(NSW) was the first Australian state to enact legislation allowing
incorporated firms to include nonlawyer owners without restriction.189 The
statute imposed management-related provisions intended to allay concerns

186. Proactive Regulation: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ORG. B. COUNS. (June 22, 2017),
https://nobc.org/resources/Documents/Entity%20Regulation/2017-6-22%20FAQs%20NOBC%2
0Proactive%20regulation%20Committee.pdf [http://perma.cc/AMC6-5XE3]. For a thorough
discussion of proactive regulation’s role in promoting public protection by preventing problematic
behavior, see Laurel S. Terry, The Power of Lawyer Regulators to Increase Client & Public Protection Through
Adoption of a Proactive Regulation System, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 717 (2016).
187. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote Compliance
with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 584 (2011).
188. See Susan Saab Fortney, Promoting Public Protection through an “Attorney Integrity” System: Lessons
from the Australian Experience with Proactive Regulation of Lawyers, 23 PROF. LAW. 16, 17 (2015) [hereinafter
Attorney Integrity System].
189. For an in-depth description for the development of PMBR in Australia, see Susan Saab
Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management System to Survive and Thrive: A Study of the
Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 152 (2012) [hereinafter
Management-Based Regulation].
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related to new structures, called “incorporated legal practices” (ILPs).190
First, the statute required that the incorporated firms appoint a legal
practitioner director to be generally responsible for the management of the
firm. Second, the statute required that the director ensure that “appropriate
management systems” are implemented and maintained to enable the
provision of legal services in accordance with obligation imposed by law.191
Because the statute did not define appropriate management systems, the
Legal Services Commissioner for NSW worked with various stakeholders,
including bar groups and legal malpractice insurers, to determine what
approach to use.192 Rather than imposing prescriptive rules, they
determined that the preferred approach would be to develop guidelines that
addressed lawyers’ professional principles.193 Using that approach, they
articulated ten objectives of sound practice based on types of concerns that
lead to complaints against practitioners, such as conflicts of interest and
supervision lapses.194
In an effort to give practitioners guidance in meeting the objectives, the
Legal Services Commissioner also worked with stakeholders to devise a selfassessment process. The self-assessment process required that the firm’s
director complete a self-assessment form (SAF).195 The SAF listed the ten
objectives with indicative criteria to guide the director in evaluating the
firm’s implementation of appropriate management systems with respect to
each objective.196 The SAF required that the director rate the firm’s
compliance with the each of the ten objectives on a scale ranging from
“Fully Compliant” to “Non-Compliant.”197 When the SAF indicated that
the firm was “Non-Compliant” or “Partially Compliant,” a representative
from the Commissioner’s Office worked with the firm to achieve
compliance.198 The entire process became known as “education towards
190. Susan Saab Fortney, The Role of Ethics Audits in Improving Management Systems and Practices:
An Empirical Examination of Management-Based Regulation of Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL.
& ETHICS 112, 118 (2014) [hereinafter Ethics Audits].
191. Id.
192. See Management-Based Regulation, supra note 189, at 160–65 (describing the development of
the objectives and the self-assessment process).
193. Id. at 160.
194. Id. at 162.
195. Id. at 163.
196. “Specifically, the self-assessment document provides a list of objectives and the key
concepts for [the] ILPs to consider when assessing each objective.” Id.
197. Attorney Integrity System, supra note 188, at 17.
198. Id.
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compliance” because it gave the director the opportunity to first engage in
self-examination of management practices and then obtain guidance from
regulators.199 Because the approach focuses on prevention and mitigation,
Professor Ted Schneyer referred to the NSW program as the prototype for
“proactive, management based regulation.”200
Empirical studies examined the impact of the NSW approach to proactive
regulation. Dr. Christine Parker conducted the first study that focused on
the complaint rates against firms that completed the self-assessment
process.201 Her study found that complaint rates for incorporated firms
went down by two-thirds after the firms completed their initial selfassessment.202 Another noteworthy finding was that the complaint rate for
firms that completed the self-assessment process was one-third of the
number of complaints registered against non-incorporated legal
practices.203
Following publication of the study results, I was interested in knowing
more about the impact of the “appropriate management systems”
requirement and the self-assessment process. In 2012, I conducted a mixedmethod study to learn more about how the self-assessment process affected
lawyer conduct in firms and how the self-assessment process could be
improved.204
First, to obtain data on the relationship between self-assessment and
conduct, my questionnaire asked respondents to note the steps taken after
the firm’s first completion of the self-assessment process. The majority
(84%) reviewed firm policies and procedures and 71% indicated that they
revised firm systems, policies, and procedures.205 Close to half (47%)
reported that they actually adopted new systems, policies, and
procedures.206
In interviews, directors also described how they learned from the process
by systematically reviewing their firm’s practices and management controls.
The majority (62%) indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the
199. Id.
200. Schneyer, supra note 66, at 584.
201. See Management-Based Regulation, supra note 189, at 166–67 (reviewing Dr. Parker’s research
questions and results).
202. Id. at 167.
203. Id.
204. For a description of the methodology, see id. at 168–69.
205. For most steps taken by firms, there was no significant difference related to firm size and
the steps taken. Id. at 173.
206. Id.
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following statement: “The SAP was a learning exercise that enabled our firm
to improve client service.”207 Only 15% disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement.208 The respondents also recognized the positive effects
of the self-assessment process in dealing with problems. Sixty-five percent
of the respondents agreed that the self-assessment process assisted the firm
in addressing problems.209 Only 13% disagreed with the statement.210
“Quite simply, these findings point to the positive impact that the selfassessment process has in encouraging firms to examine and improve the
firms’ management systems, training, and ethical infrastructure.”211
Following the Australian experience and studies, regulators in other
countries examined and implemented PMBR programs. The Canadian Bar
Association developed a voluntary, self-assessment form to assist Canadian
law firms and lawyers in “systematically examin[ing] the ethical
infrastructure that supports their legal practices.”212 Rather than using such
a voluntary approach, the Canadian province of Nova Scotia moved forward
with an ambitious agenda for regulatory reform to regulate in a manner they
describe as “proactive, principled and proportional.”213 A centerpiece of
this reform is a comprehensive self-assessment tool that must be completed
by all law firms.214
In the southwest U.S., Colorado conducted a multi-year study
that culminated in a comprehensive on-line self-assessment tool.215
The Colorado approach is entirely voluntary, using outreach and incentives
to encourage lawyers to complete the self-assessment process that

207. Management-Based Regulation, supra note 189, at 175 (quoting IIL. REPORT, at Question 18,
#7).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 178 n.158. According to the report, 7% checked “strongly agree” and 58% checked
“agree.” Id.
210. The 15% breaks down to 10% who disagreed with the statement and 3% who strongly
disagreed. Id. at 178 n.159.
211. Attorney Integrity System, supra note 188, at 19.
212. CBA Ethical Practices Self-Evaluation Tool, CAN. B. ASS’N, http://www.lians.ca/sites/
default/files/documents/00077358.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4D3-MBPJ].
213. Legal Services Regulation, NOVA SCOTIA BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y, http://nsbs.org/legal-servicesregulation [http://perma.cc/LN4U-4LHX].
214. Management Systems for Ethical Legal Practice (MSELP), NOVA SCOTIA BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y,
http://nsbs.org/management-systems-ethical-legal-practice-mselp [http://perma.cc/U95L-GBJZ].
215. Lawyer Self-Assessment Program, COLO. SUP. CT OFF. OF ATT’Y REG.,
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/AboutUs/LawyerSelfAssessmentProgram.asp
[http://perma.cc/5EHP-NLF6].
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emphasizes “high-quality client service, efficient law office management,
and compliance with professional obligations.”216
Moving to the Midwest, Illinois took the pioneering step in becoming the
first jurisdiction in the U.S. to implement a form of PMBR to address
concerns related to uninsured lawyers.217 In 2017, the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted a rule requiring that all uninsured lawyers complete an online self-assessment regarding the operation of their law firm.218 Following
the lawyers’ self-assessment, the Illinois regulator will provide the lawyer
with a list of resources to improve those practices that are identified during
the self-assessment process.219
As explained by Lloyd A. Karmeier, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, “PMBR promises a new level of protection for the
public.”220 Rather than relying on the reactive disciplinary systems that deal
with misconduct after it occurs, Chief Justice Karmeier explains that
“PMBR is aimed at helping lawyers avoid disciplinary problems before they
occur.”221
The Illinois program was intended to provide assistance to uninsured
lawyers with the expectation that such training will improve their practice
management and lower the risk of disciplinary and malpractice
complaints.222 According to James Grogan, the deputy director of the
Illinois Supreme Court’s Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission
(Illinois Commission), the Commission chose to focus first on uninsured
lawyers who are “most at risk.”223 Grogan also noted that the process of
purchasing insurance forces lawyers to think about their protocols,
suggesting that uninsured lawyers do not have that opportunity.224
The Illinois self-assessment process is an interactive online educational
program covering professional responsibility requirements for operating a
216. Id.
217. Press Release, Supreme Court of Ill., Illinois Becomes First State to Adopt Proactive
Management Based Regulation (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Media/PressRel/2017/
012417.pdf. [http://perma.cc/YLA2-YT6T] [hereinafter Illinois Supreme Court Press Release].
218. ILL. S. CT. R. 756(e) (eff. Mar. 15, 2004).
219. Ill. Supreme Court Press Release, supra note 217.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Joan C. Rogers, Illinois Kicks Off Era of Proactive Lawyer Regulation, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/illinois-kicks-off-n57982083522/ [http://perma.cc/5G7WFD2S].
223. Id.
224. Id.
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law firm.225 Illinois-licensed attorneys who represent private clients, but
who do not have malpractice insurance, must complete the four-hour
interactive, online self-assessment course regarding the operation of their
firms.226 Lawyers who complete the entire program receive four hours of
free continuing legal education credit.227
The Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois Commission should be
recognized for their creative approach to helping uninsured lawyers improve
their management practices. The hope is that uninsured lawyers will not
just check the boxes but engage in serious self-examination of their
management practices. The study results on PMBR in Australia suggest this
self-examination will benefit both the lawyers and the clients they serve.
Since conducting an empirical study on PMBR, I have actively promoted
PMBR through numerous articles, presentations, and workshops. Although
I am a staunch proponent of PMBR and commend any PMBR initiative to
assist uninsured lawyers, I do not think that PMBR substitutes for
mandatory insurance.228 PMBR should help lawyers improve their
practices and may lower their risk of disciplinary complaints and malpractice
complaints. This clearly advances public protection by avoiding problems.
PMBR, however, does not address the risk of asset insufficiency in the event
of a malpractice claim.229 In order to provide a source of recovery (and the
other benefits discussed in Part Two) states should require mandatory
insurance for lawyers in private practice. Even with the best management
systems in place, malpractice occurs. When it does, insurance provides a
source of recovery for those harmed by attorney malpractice.

225. Id.
226. PMBR Self-Assessment Course FAQs, ILL. ATT’Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY
COMMISSION, https://registration.iardc.org/attyreg/Registration/Registration_Department/PMBR_
FAQs/Registration/regdept/Rule_756e2_Self-Assessment_FAQ_s.aspx
[http://perma.cc/8EP6FAK4].
227. Id.
228. A jurisdiction that is considering PMBR as an approach to dealing with uninsured lawyers
can take steps to incentivize lawyers to purchase insurance. One way of doing so is to require that the
uninsured lawyers complete a process similar to that used in Australia, where the results of the selfassessment are reported to the regulator, with the requirement that the lawyer address problem areas.
Failure to do so can subject the firm to a practice audit by the regulator.
229. Because the Illinois PMBR requirement for uninsured lawyers is a free, online CLE that
takes four hours, it is doubtful that it will incentivize many lawyers to purchase insurance.
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V. CONCLUSION—EXPOSING LAWYERS’ ETHICAL BLIND SPOTS
Given the compelling arguments in favor of insurance and the fact that
the majority of lawyers in private practice carry insurance, the question
remains why more states have not mandated insurance for lawyers in private
practice.230 One explanation may be that lawyers and decisionmakers may
be suffering from ethical blind spots on both the individual and
organizational levels. Findings from the burgeoning field of behavioral
ethics provide insights on how the lawyers and judges may not clearly see
the ethical dimensions of conduct and decisions related to malpractice
insurance.231
Behavioral “research has shown that unethical behavior often stems from
actions that actors do not recognize as unethical.”232 On an individual level,
decisionmakers experience ethical blind spots when they do not see the
ethical issues involved in a decision or when they believe that any potential
ethical challenges can easily be overcome.233 This psychological
phenomenon may explain why many reputable attorneys do not purchase
insurance and oppose mandatory malpractice insurance. Their ethical blind
spot may impede their ability to recognize that the purchase of insurance
involves ethical dimensions related to professional accountability and access
to justice for malpractice victims. Lawyers who refuse to purchase insurance
may not see the ethical imperative for lawyers to be financially accountable
for those they harm. In this sense they may look at themselves in the mirror,
and do not question the ethicality of their decisions because the insurance
issue is in their blind spot.
Increasingly, lawyers are equating ethical conduct with the minimum
standards for avoiding discipline under the professional rules of professional
conduct. This approach is very narrow, reducing “ethics” to an exercise of
determining whether the disciplinary rules address particular issues. When
the rules do not address a situation, lawyers may stop deliberations and not
230. Recently, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied the Petition of the State Bar of Nevada
asking the Court to adopt a new rule requiring insurance for lawyers in private practice. Nevada Supreme
Court Order, supra note 16.
231. See MAX. H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4 (2011) (introducing behavioral ethics as a field that
seeks to understand how people actually behave when confronted with ethical dilemmas).
232. Ovul Sezer et al., Ethical Blind Spots: Explaining Unintentional Unethical Behavior, 6 CURRENT
OPINION IN PSYCHOL. 77, 77 (2015).
233. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1007,
1116 (2013).
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thoughtfully reflect on the ethical implications of their individual
decisions.234
Ethical blindness also comes into play at the organizational level, when
peers and organizational leaders fail to accurately assess the unethical
behavior of individuals. In the context of lawyering this can occur within
firms and bar groups when other lawyers ignore unethical conduct of
individuals. A number of factors contribute to the tendency to not respond
to the unethical behavior of others.235 To begin with, we may not believe
it is our place to judge others and we are busy paying attention to other
things.236 We also may be influenced by what theorists have called
motivated blindness, defined as the “the tendency for people to overlook
the unethical behavior of others when it is not in their best interest to notice
the infraction.”237
As it relates the debate of mandatory insurance, ethical blindness and
complacency may contribute to insured lawyers not getting involved.
Attorneys who recognize their individual responsibility to carry insurance
should consider the collective responsibility as members of a legal
profession charged with self-regulation and keeping our houses clean.
Rather than allowing the minority to dominate the discourse, lawyers should
speak up and actively support mandating insurance coverage. Those who
fail to support meaningful remedies for malpractice victims are abdicating
moral authority and denying access to justice. As Professor Roger Cramton
cautioned, “Justice is created or destroyed in countless ways every day: by
our actions; by how we treat others; by how we adapt to, or shape, or blindly
conform to the familiar routines of our workplace.” 238
With additional states studying the issue of mandatory malpractice
insurance, insured lawyers should get involved and help frame the
discussion in ethical terms. By exposing and dealing with ethical blind spots
lawyers help demonstrate that we are an accountable profession that can be
trusted with self-regulation.

234. See id. at 1127 (suggesting lawyers may take a “minimalist approach to ethics, substituting
rules that may only articulate minimum standards for thoughtful reflection on the ethical implications
of a decision”).
235. For an analysis of various factors, see BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 231, at 77–
99.
236. Id. at 78.
237. Id. at 79.
238. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More
Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2002).
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We all make mistakes. We are distinguished as professionals by the
manner in which we handle mistakes and treat those we injure. If members
of the bar refuse see or recognize their responsibility to injured persons and
the profession, it is the role of the insured lawyers to advocate for
malpractice insurance to help uphold the high standards of the legal
profession. If lawyers refuse to deal with their blind spots and see the ethical
dimensions of financial accountability, we do not deserve to be members of
a protected profession.

